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Abstract 
When agricultural emissions are included in the New Zealand Emission 
Trading System (ETS) the economics of farming will be significantly altered. Under 
the legislation  current in October 2009, in the early years of the system the 
agricultural sector as a whole would have received NZ units equivalent to 90% of 
2005 emissions to ease the transition. Amendments to the Bill passed in November 
have delayed the start date from 2013 to 2015 and extended the protection even 
further.  This paper addresses one of the  key issues for making an agricultural 
emissions trading system a success: how to use the allocation of NZ units to achieve 
equitable and acceptable cost sharing and a smoother transition. We first discuss the 
potential motivations for free allocation and the two extreme potential allocation 
options that could be associated with the two key motivations. The option finally 
chosen is likely to be somewhere between these two extremes. Empirical studies can 
inform assessment of options. Previous empirical studies have addressed a variety of 
questions, including what the economic impact of the system is and on whom, how 
much leakage is there likely to be, and what might be the adjustment costs. We 
discuss each of these, comparing different existing studies and addressing some 
current gaps in our understanding and knowledge with new empirical work on farm 
level impacts and on likely responses to the ETS. We conclude by laying out some 
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1  Overview 
New Zealand introduced an Emissions Trading System (ETS) starting in 2008 
to assist with its compliance with the Kyoto Protocol and future international climate 
agreements. Initially only forestry is included in the system (from 1 January 2008). Under 
current legislation, agricultural emissions
1
This paper addresses one of the key issues, how to achieve equitable and 
acceptable cost sharing within the sector. The other critical set of issues is how to report 
and verify emissions, including issues related to the point of obligation (who reports), the 
data required, and the models used to infer emissions from the data. These issues have 
been canvassed in the report from the Agriculture Technical Advisory Group, “Point of 
Obligation Designs and Allocation Methodologies for Agriculture and the New Zealand 
Emissions Trading Scheme (MAF, 2009). That paper also draws on an earlier version of 
this paper to explore some allocation issues. Allocation of nutrient allowances in water 
quality markets has many similar features and is also a new issue as no compulsory farm 
scale cap and trade system has been introduced outside New Zealand. Cost sharing in a 
nutrient trading market is discussed in Kerr and Lock (2009). 
 (methane and nitrous oxide) will fully enter the 
system from 1 January 2015. No country has included agricultural emissions before, so 
the design challenges are considerable. It is important for New Zealand to address 
agricultural emissions effectively because they make up nearly half of our gross 
emissions. If New Zealand is able to demonstrate how agricultural emissions can be 
mitigated efficiently and fairly this will be valuable to other countries where agricultural 
emissions are significant. 
Under the original legislation (in force when this paper was written)  the 
agricultural sector as a whole would have received NZ units equivalent to 90% of 2005 
emissions. This is a total of 33.7m tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent, CO2-e. The 
annual allocation was intended to phase-out linearly between 2018 and 2030. This was 
consistent with the treatment of all other sectors. At $25 per tonne of CO2-e this implied 
allocation of more than $5bn up to 2018. These free units were intended to offset part of 
the even greater costs of compliance and ease transition. Choices about how to allocate 
the units within the agricultural sector really matter.  
                                                            
1  The ETS (agriculture) includes greenhouse gases from pastoral agriculture, horticulture and arable 
production  –  methane from livestock emissions  and nitrous oxide from animal urine and dung and 
synthetic fertiliser.   2 
The amended legislation passed in November 2009 includes intensity based 
allocation to agriculture which is considerably more generous and phases out much more 
slowly. Despite the phase out, the dollar cost of protection to the taxpayer is likely to 
grow at least initially as the agricultural sector continues to grow. The implications for the 
economy as a whole are similar to those of the subsidies to agriculture in the mid 1980s.  
In this paper we first discuss the potential motivations for free allocation and 
the two extreme potential allocation options that could be associated with these 
motivations. The best option is likely to be somewhere between these two extremes. 
We develop a list of criteria against which to assess allocation options. A 
variety of empirical studies can inform assessment against these criteria. These empirical 
studies have addressed different questions including what is the economic impact of the 
system and on whom, how much leakage is there likely to be, and what might be the 
adjustment costs. We discuss each of these below including comparing different existing 
studies and addressing some current gaps in our understanding and knowledge. We 
conclude by laying out some key options for allocation design and drawing links between 
these and the empirical material. 
1.1.1  What are the motivations for free allocation?  
Table 1 the government’s stated motivations and links most of these to three 
key objectives, which we discuss more fully below. It is not clear exactly what 
government would regards as ‘perverse’, so we have not mapped ‘avoid perverse 
incentives’ as an allocation objective, although it is important.  
Table 1: Summary of government’s stated motivations in design of free allocation 
Act  Key Objectives for free allocation 
Avoid economic regrets  Reduce damage/minimise regret 
from reduced production 
Avoid concentrated job losses   
Avoid perverse incentives   
Framework document   
Avoid regrets   Ease adjustment 
Manage transition  Partially compensate for losses 
Maintain equity    
Only compensate where 
there are losses 
 
Move to zero assistance over time   
Free allocation can address three broad objectives: to reduce damage from 
reductions in output; to ease adjustment into the system; and to partially compensate for 
losses. These can be jointly addressed to a certain extent but compromises are inevitable    
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between the three objectives. Policy design should be informed by the relative 
importance of these three broad objectives. 
1.2  Key allocation choices and tradeoffs 
Two extreme allocation options each focus purely on one objective, but may 
contribute to the others. 
Option 1. Allocate on basis of farmers’ loss of equity – partially compensate for loss. 
•  This allocation would be given to the owners of agricultural land at a fixed 
historical date.  
•  It would not be contingent on any future behaviour including land use change or 
sale of property.   
•  The allocation formula would be based on geophysical characteristics and land 
use at the fixed date, or on estimated historical emissions. 
 
Option 2. Allocation on output basis – minimise regret from reduced production. 
•  Allocation could be given at the processor level in the form of a rebate/subsidy 
per unit of output processed (if farmer is point of obligation) or lower emissions 
charges (if processor is point of obligation).   
•  The allocation to each processor could be targeted more closely to avoiding 
regrets resulting from leakage if it were made to depend on the amount of 
product exported in the previous period. 
•  The allocation per unit of output could be fixed for several periods in advance 
(possibly the commitment period) to minimise uncertainty as a result of growth 
or contraction in the agricultural sector. 
 
Both options will provide partial compensation, but the first can be more 
closely targeted to those most seriously affected. Option 1 may also reduce regret to the 
extent that it helps avoid bankruptcy and change in production forced by capital 
constraints. Both options will ease adjustment for some groups. A combination of the 
two options could be used, or there could be a transition from one to the other.  
Not all the free allocation needs to be given to farmers. Some acute impacts 
could occur off farms especially under option 1 which would allow production to sharply 
contract in regions where, for example, forestry is attractive relative to sheep/beef 
farming. Some of the value of the units could be used to assist communities and workers. 
1.3  Financial and behavioural effects of the Emissions Trading System  
We start this section by outlining the likely effects of the ETS, giving context 
for more in-depth discussion of motivations and for empirical work presented later in 
this paper.    4 
The major financial impact of the system will be on farm profitability, and, as 
a consequence, on land values. Landowners are likely to bear the majority of the cost 
because lower land values will lead to loss of equity. In the short run, if capital markets 
are relatively inflexible, introducing the trading system could lead to possible bankruptcy, 
even for farms that would be viable in the long run. This may particularly be the case for 
people who bought farms recently and have large debts. 
The direct impacts on farm profitability will translate to effects on rural 
communities. To the extent that production is reduced and land use changes, rural 
workers will also be affected. 
Initial costs to farmers are likely to be higher than ongoing costs (unless 
carbon prices escalate) because farmers will gradually begin to reduce and mitigate 
emissions. We have evidence that the emissions trading system will induce some land use 
change, and that there may be a small fall in land use intensity on sheep/beef farms. 
These may lead to lower profitability relative to a situation with no greenhouse gas 
charges, but raise profitability when responses to charges are optimal.  
Greenhouse emissions per unit of output vary considerably across farms, 
which suggests scope for mitigation. This is the case even for methane, where it is 
possible to change the efficiency with which grass (dry matter) is used to produce meat 
and milk. The question is, to what extent it will be possible for farmers to manipulate this 
variation to further improve their productivity and hence mitigate their emissions. These 
mitigation options will have a cost. However, when we factor in the reduced cost of NZ 
units, mitigation will lead to a net saving. 
Figure 1: Emission reduction / mitigation cost curves 











Emission reduction –  possible 
leakage or food security issues 
mitigation 
Non-price 
barriers     
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Figure 1 illustrates the different ways in which emissions can be reduced or 
mitigated. Some options appear to be profitable at current costs but are not taken up by 
farmers. This suggests there are non-price barriers that will not be addressed by the ETS 
alone. We will thus not consider those as responses to the system. The other three 
options will be price responsive. The more flexible farmers’ responses are, the lower the 
individual and aggregate costs of the emissions trading system will be. 
1.4  Objective 1: Partially compensate 
If agriculture entered the emissions trading system and was responsible for 
surrendering NZ units to match all emissions, and there was no free allocation, there 
would be significant losses of farm and processor profit. Some of these losses will be 
capitalised into land values and some will be passed onto agricultural workers, rural 
communities and others.  
Losses are likely to be concentrated on a relatively small group of individuals. 
Nearly all agricultural products are exported into an international market where New 
Zealand has little or no market power, so producers have limited ability to pass cost 
increases on to consumers. Domestic prices can be expected to rise as a direct result of 
the ETS but international prices will rise little, if at all. These concentrated losses impose 
a high share of the cost of climate change policy on a relatively small group. This can be 
argued to be inequitable. It will generate significant opposition which will make the 
system extremely difficult to implement and operate, and could cause it to collapse. 
Partial compensation for loss involves two key questions for policy makers: 
first a philosophical question, ‘What equity principles do we want to apply?’; and second 
an empirical question, ‘Who is likely to lose and how much?’. The final cost bearing 
needs to be perceived as ‘fair’ and ‘acceptable’. Researchers and policy makers need to 
continue exploring what this will mean in a practical sense. 
1.4.1  How ‘should’ the cost of climate policy be shared? 
There is no correct answer to this question but it is a key question if free 
allocation of units is used to partially compensate some of those who would otherwise 
bear costs. It could be argued that those who benefit from climate policy should bear the 
burden. Given the diffuse nature of benefits and the large uncertainties, within New 
Zealand this would suggest a wide base. Given that the emissions trading system is   6 
comprehensive, the appropriate burden on farmers relative to other taxpayers would 
then depend on how other costs of the wider regulation are borne. 
Alternatively, the ‘polluter pays’ principle argues for putting a higher share of 
the burden on those who are current or historical (‘legacy’) polluters. In the case of 
greenhouse gas regulation, this still argues for a broad basis for cost sharing but suggests 
that costs arising from agricultural emissions should be borne within the agricultural 
sector. The polluter pays principle also suggests that those who have already lowered 
emissions should not be penalised for their positive past actions. This argues against 
allocation on a recent historical basis. 
Within New Zealand, Maori, and particularly the owners of Maori land, are 
distinctive. Any allocation method needs to be sensitive to this and may need to be able 
to respond in a flexible way. 
Principles of social justice suggest that we should take care to protect those 
who are poor and vulnerable. These may be smaller or highly indebted farmers, farm 
workers, or vulnerable people within particularly affected rural communities. This would 
suggest that greater weight might be given to smaller, less profitable farms (if those 
correlate with poorer farmers) and that the value from some free units should be used to 
fund programmes to assist the vulnerable as they adjust to the changes. 
Legal arguments emphasise protection of existing property rights. This is used 
to argue for allocation on an historical basis. In contrast, others argue that landowners 
should have equal rights to develop properties, which could be seen as simply a different 
interpretation of existing property rights – the right to maintain future options as well as 
to continue current use. This is of particular relevance to Maori who tend to have 
relatively underdeveloped land – in part because of their inability to use their land as 
collateral for loans, in part because they have received some land only recently through 
Treaty settlements, and in part because some land was in forestry at the time of the 
settlement. 
  None of these arguments for how to allocate resources for free allocation 
is ‘correct’. The challenge is to find an allocation that is widely perceived to be fair and 
that is acceptable to a wide enough group to facilitate compliance and constructive 
responses to the regulation.    
  7 
1.5  Objective 2: Reduce damage from fall in production 
If farmers respond by changing land use or reducing intensity and hence 
output, this could have negative effects in three ways. First, ‘leakage’ could lead to higher 
global emissions as a result of the ETS. Leakage arises when, as a result of carbon 
regulation in New Zealand and an incomplete global agreement, production falls in New 
Zealand and rises in a country that is not covered by the Kyoto or post-Kyoto 
international agreement cap. Regardless of New Zealand’s relative greenhouse gas 
(GHG) efficiency in production, a movement of production to an un-covered country 
will raise their emissions above business as usual (BAU), while the sum of emissions 
under the international agreement cap will be unchanged. Thus global emissions will rise 
relative to BAU. Because of this global externality, production in New Zealand would be 
inefficiently penalised on the margin by the ETS (Hoel, 1996). The key question is 
whether the damage from leakage is greater than the costs of avoiding it. 
In New Zealand, agriculture has been argued to be a potential target for 
leakage policy because NZ producers are largely price takers so cannot pass costs on to 
consumers,  and because the emissions intensity of New Zealand production is low 
relative to the same products produced elsewhere (Saunders and Barber, 2009); on the 
other hand, leakage from agriculture may be fairly low. Land cannot move, and good 
quality land is unlikely to move out of agriculture in any significant way. Because New 
Zealand producers are generally price takers, a reduction in NZ production may not lead 
to a large change elsewhere. Because of recent rapid domestic growth (at least until late 
2008), which has been straining the agricultural sector, climate change policy is unlikely 
to create a large excess of capital, which would otherwise have been invested in New 
Zealand agriculture but now will be invested offshore; it is also unlikely to send skilled 
agricultural labour overseas, at least in the short run. These factors reduce leakage and 
regrets in agriculture. 
Second, the fact that we are competing with unregulated countries in the short 
term may lead to production leaving New Zealand, which in the long run we would 
regret when (or if) there is a global agreement. If New Zealand is relatively GHG 
efficient in agricultural production, we will have a long-term comparative advantage in 
this production and we will want a strong agricultural sector in the long term. Losing 
efficient production in the short term could lead to long term regrets if New Zealand 
loses key capabilities. We could regret, for example, a situation where processing capacity 
and the quality of herds falls in ways that are hard to quickly reverse; or we could regret a   8 
situation where land moves into forestry or indigenous regeneration, which is relatively 
costly to reverse in the short term. Short-term reductions in output could also lead to 
unnecessary social pain as small rural communities struggle to adjust to lower economic 
activity. Any shift in production involves adjustment costs. If these are incurred and then 
the issue of leakage is resolved and it is efficient for production to rise again, New 
Zealand will regret having borne the adjustment cost. It is also possible that a short-term 
loss could lead to long-term dynamic consequences through loss of market share; the 
short-term production loss may lead to loss of a longer-term opportunity.
2
The previous Government indicated in its engagement material that it was 
most concerned to avoid the loss of economic activity where there would be long term 
regrets associated with firms closing or substantially reducing output levels; where there 
are likely to be concentrated job losses; and where there could be reputational issues for 
New Zealand. 
 
Third, if the fall in New Zealand’s food production is not replaced by 
increased production overseas, it will contribute to the global problem of food insecurity 
and recent high food prices, if other countries are unable to easily expand alternative 
food production. The less emissions leak, the more we contribute to potential food 
shortages. These are all reasons to avoid a fall in production.  Three arguments go against 
this. 
First, leakage is not necessarily against New Zealand’s economic interests; it 
will make compliance with New Zealand’s targets easier. The production that is lost is 
worth less in terms of profit than the cost of buying additional emission units. If 
emission obligations are not devolved this cost is borne by taxpayers as a fiscal cost.  
Second, dairy and sheep/beef farming also affect other environmental goals. 
For example, water quality is being threatened by dairy conversions in many catchments. 
Biodiversity could benefit from reduced pastoral grazing, especially if some of the 
pasture was replaced by native regeneration. Regulation has not yet fully addressed most 
of these other environmental concerns. The positive side effects of reduced pastoral 
production on other environmental goods could partially offset environmental concerns 
about leakage. 
                                                            
2 For a discussion of the drivers of ‘regret’ from leakage see Kerr and Coleman (2008).    
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Third, protecting production is extremely  costly,  especially if it is done 
through free allocation.
3
1.5.1  Policies to address a fall in production leading to leakage and regret 
 Each $1.00 used to provide free allocation of NZ units costs the 
economy around $1.40 to raise through distortionary taxation. Protection through free 
allocation cannot be a long term option. So what are the options if we choose to protect 
production?  
Leakage can be addressed in four ways:   
•  border adjustments; 
•  output-based free allocation;  
•  progressive obligation; and 
•  an ex-post environmental correction. 
All of these options treat new entrants in the same way as existing farmers.   
With border adjustments, any product that is exported would be rebated at 
average emissions per unit of product at the border, so that New Zealand producers on 
average face a level playing field in international markets (equivalently imports from 
countries not included under the international cap could be taxed on the basis of 
estimated emissions from that country). This is the most efficient option because it 
directly corrects the source of the problem. It does not subsidise domestic consumption 
and preserves incentives to reduce emissions per unit of production. There are some 
legal issues however about whether this would be construed as a subsidy. No other 
country is yet using border adjustments but several are considering it (mostly to protect 
domestic production against imports).
4
With output-based allocation, relative emissions per unit output would first be 
established across sectors (e.g. emissions per kilo milk solids versus sheep meat). Then in 
each year, each farmer or processor (or any other entity receiving free allocation) would 
be awarded NZ units based on their production the year before (or two years before if 
data problems arise). They would be entitled to a share of the total free allocation pool 
based on their production as a share of total agricultural production weighted by the 
relative emissions weights (which should not change over time). If free allocation is done 
 
                                                            
3 For an analysis of the costs and benefits of different ways to address leakage in the European Trading 
System see Quirion and Demailly (2008). 
4 For a recent discussion of these issues see Frankel (2008).   10 
at a late point in the value chain it is possible that allocation would be in proportion to 
product exported rather than total production – this would be more efficient as it does 
not subsidise domestic consumption of GHG intensive foods. 
From a farmer’s point of view, output-based allocation would mean that if 
they increase production they do not have to cover the full cost of the extra emissions 
associated with that production. This reduces the pressure for leakage. If they allow their 
production to fall, they are penalised by a fall in free allocation. They still have full 
incentives to reduce emissions per unit of production because free allocation relates only 
to production levels while their obligations (whether  direct or passed  through from 
processors) are related to emissions per unit of production as well as to production 
levels. 
One effect of this system is that if one sector expands relative to another, the 
free allocation of the more static sector falls in total as well as per unit output – this is 
because they are sharing a fixed pool. If this uncertainty is considered undesirable, this 
effect could be minimised by setting the free allocation share based on projections and 
fixing them for each five-year period. Any errors would be taken into account in the 
share fixed for the next five-year period. 
Progressive obligations achieve a similar objective. Rather than being 
responsible for all emissions, the point of obligation would need to cover only some 
percentage. This reduces leakage pressure because the increase in cost of production is 
lower. However, it also reduces the incentive to reduce emissions per unit of output 
because the effects of these reductions have lower value in reducing cost. This is exactly 
equivalent to allocation on the basis of current emissions. It is inferior to all other 
options from an efficiency point of view as well as having no obvious equity advantage. 
One final option, an ex-post environmental correction, addresses emisisons 
leakage but not regret. No effort would be made to  protect production. The actual 
change in production could be compared to predicted counterfactual production if the 
playing field had been level.  The government could voluntarily surrender additional units 
to the United Nations to offset the estimated environmental effect of leakage. This 
would fully address the environmental concern and be very low cost relative to the 
alternatives.   
The leakage policy will also partially define the compensation policy. To the 
extent that free allocation is allocated through output based allocation, border rebates or    
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progressive obligation, less of the pool will be available for compensation based on loss 
of asset value, or compensation or transition assistance to critically affected workers and 
communities. 
1.6  Objective 3:  Ease adjustment  
Complying with the emissions trading system will be a significant challenge for 
the agricultural sector. Understanding greenhouse gas emissions, emissions trading and 
what they mean for land use and farm management will require farmers to learn new 
skills. If they need to do this quickly they are likely to incur unnecessary economic costs 
and make serious errors which could have long term consequences. Large changes in 
farmers’ balance sheets and the need to change behaviour rapidly will also impose larger 
than necessary costs. Communities would also be adversely affected by a rapid change in 
economic activity and employment in their area. Large reductions in output might lead to 
significant concentrated adjustment costs. 
The form of free allocation could ease this transition by allowing farmers to 
adopt a ‘wait and see’ approach for a year or two and not change their behaviour 
substantially until they have more information. If they choose to act fast they could still 
benefit from doing this. It also allows them to pay off some recently incurred debt which 
was incurred on the assumption of historical rates of profitability. Farmer adjustment 
costs can and should also be reduced in other ways such as through  education, 
development of credible information sources and early action – these should be explored 
in more depth.  
Community adjustment costs would be eased with a more gradual reduction in 
output and hence employment and economic activity.
5
1.7  Criteria for assessing free allocation options 
 It may also be able to be eased 
through programmes directly targeted at vulnerable communities and workers. 
We have three basic criteria: achieving the goals defined by the balance 
between the three objectives; behavioural incentives; and convenience - administrative 
feasibility (for farmer and government). The bullet points below flesh out these criteria. 
Each allocation option needs to be assessed against these. 
                                                            
5 The introduction of an emissions charge is conceptually similar to the removal of government farming 
subsidies in New Zealand after 1984. See “Economic reform in New Zealand 1984-85: The Pursuit of 
Efficiency” (Evans et al, 1996). For  more on this historical context and on adjustment costs generally see 
sections beginning on p.31 and p.50 respectively. .   12 
A  Achievement of goals 
Partial Compensation 
o  Who will actually receive/benefit from free allocations?  Will it be those who 
bear losses – mostly land owners? 
o  Will it penalise those who are already GHG efficient? 
o  Will it be perceived as equitable? 
Reduce damage from fall in production 
o  What production is likely to fall and or ‘leak’ (be replaced offshore)? 
o  How much damage would this cause? 
o  How well does the allocation option address the fall in production and 
leakage? 
Adjustment 
o  How large will the difference between the farmer’s obligation to surrender NZ 
units (directly or indirectly) and his/her free allocation in the first years be?   
o  What does the farmer have to do immediately to be in compliance? 
o  What would be the consequences of a farmer’s inaction? Fine?  Loss of 
potential profit? 
o  Will some communities suffer concentrated asset and employment losses 
under this option? 
B  Behavioural incentives 
o  What effect will the allocation have on behaviour/land use change and hence 
total cost? 
o  Will new investment be efficient – is it treated equally with expansion of 
incumbents? 
o  Are incentives to reduce emission intensity/adopt new technology and 
management practices efficient? 
o  Is there a perverse incentive to sustain/expand output or emissions or to lock 
in land use? 
C  Convenience - Feasibility 
o  What data are required to implement this option?  Are they unambiguous and 
verifiable? 
o  What will the additional cost of collecting and reporting these data be for 
farmers/processors and government? 
o  Is it dependent on science and if so, how credible/acceptable is that?    
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o  What are the incentives for farmers/processors to bias the data they provide 
in response? 
  In any system it is critical to make allocation rules simple and base them on 
readily available data that cannot be challenged. 
 
2  Empirical evidence relevant to designing free allocation 
Here we consider empirical evidence relevant to the three motivations. 
2.1  What is the economic impact and on whom? 
We first consider the impact on profits if farmers do not change their 
behaviour in any way and there is no free allocation. This is the area ABCD in Figure 2. 
We then consider the potential to reduce emission liability and hence reduce impact on 
profit. Within this we consider possible land use change; then changes in intensity and 
particularly stocking rates; and finally the potential for mitigation – reducing emissions 
per unit output. In this section we present the numbers with no free allocation because 
we do not want to prejudge the form of that free allocation. The total amount of free 
allocation is equal to nearly 90% of 2006 liability so will be able to blunt the impact 
considerably particularly in the early years. The aggregate net liability will depend on 
growth in agricultural production and our ability to mitigate emissions. 







Impact – no response:  ABCD 
Agricultural emissions 
on average farm 
$25 
Current emissions = 
Marginal costs of different 
responses 
savings 
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The impacts of an emissions trading system vary depending on the type of 
farm (e.g. sheep/beef vs. dairy; region; intensity) that is being considered as well as within 
different farm types. Studies to date focus on a variety of different farm types and use 
different assumptions. The results we present here are from work within Motu that 
almost replicates work by (MAF, 2008b) and Meat and Wool New Zealand (unpublished) 
but is recreated to allow us to present consistent results in a variety of ways. To be 
consistent with their work we include all on-farm greenhouse gas emissions (e.g. from 
fuel and electricity use), not only methane and nitrous oxide. We include only on-farm 
emissions because we do not have measures of off-farm impacts (e.g. through transport 
and processing) for sectors other than dairy. In the dairy sector, Fonterra (New Zealand’s 
largest dairy processor) estimate that the off-farm impact adds an additional 15% to the 
emissions liability. In the sheep/beef sector the off-farm impacts are likely to be much 
lower. 
2.1.1  Farm profit before tax’ vs. ‘earnings before interest and tax’ 
The impact can be measured in two basic ways. Farm profit before tax 
(henceforth ‘cash profit’) defines the financial profitability of the farm business taking 
into account the level of indebtedness.
6
Economic profit or ‘earnings before interest and tax’ (EBIT) determines the 
long-term economic viability of the land use, excluding the cost of purchasing the land.
 If cash profit falls significantly, and particularly if 
it falls below zero for an extended period, we would anticipate that the current farmer 
would be forced to sell and may go bankrupt. However, the land use may not change as a 
result. The current farmer may have bought the land at a high price and have high debt 
levels. A new farmer may be able to buy the land cheaply and continue to operate. 
7
                                                            
6 Farm profit before tax = Gross Farm Revenue (including the change in livestock value) – Total Farm 
Expenditure (including Interest and Depreciation but excluding any internal wages paid to the owners or 
imputed management fees). From farm profit before tax farm (business) owner meet their tax payments, 
debt payments  (principal), capital purchases and living expenses. Any shortfall can only be met by 
increased overdraft facilities, refinancing (including asset sales) or new capital. 
 
If land were valued only according to its potential stream of agricultural profits, 
percentage changes in economic profit would imply percentage changes in land values. 
Thus the change in economic profit gives an indicator of loss of equity. A significant loss 
of economic profit could be expected to lead to changes in land use. 
7 EBIT is calculated by EBIT = Farm profit before tax + Interest +Rent.   
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The percentage impact of the ETS on cash profit will always be greater than 
on economic profit. Over the last eight years impact on cash profit was on average 53 % 
(sheep/beef) and 32% (dairy) larger than on economic profit. We present both results to 
distinguish between effects on current farmers and effects on long term sectoral viability 
and also to avoid the effect of different levels of indebtedness on comparisons of 
economic impact. 
2.1.2  Differences in impact across sectors 
  We see in Table 2 that in 2006, with a $25 CO2-e price, the emissions 
liability is around $36,000 per year in dairy and $40,000 per year in sheep/beef.
8
  Over the last seven years, the sheep/beef sector would have faced nearly 
twice the impact on both cash and economic profit relative to the dairy sector. In 2008 
the percentage impacts were strikingly different because of the very high profits in dairy.  
This illustrates the danger of looking at individual years of data.  
 All of 
these estimates assume that no costs are passed on to either consumers or workers. The 
after tax impact on profit will also be lower by as much as 39% of the dollar impact.  
  We include 2006 results because these can be compared with MAF (2008) 
estimates for a wide range of agricultural sectors. Deer seem to be affected similarly to 
sheep/beef in the North Island. South Island deer farms are less affected in percentage 
terms simply because they are more profitable. 
Horticulture is affected mostly by energy costs which are not the focus of this 
paper. Most of the N fertiliser is applied to ‘grain’ (520 farms) and ‘grain-sheep and 
grain-beef cattle’(250 farms) farming (Catalyst R&D, 2008).  Those growing grain for 
livestock may also have some costs passed on to them from the livestock producers so 
may face indirect impacts. Most of the remaining N is applied to vegetables with a high 
per ha application rate but with a cost per farm of only a third of that on farms with 
grain. 
                                                            
8 Our emissions are slightly lower than the MAF modelling for dairy as a result of our different method of 
calculation. In 2006, MAF estimates a loss of cash profit in dairy of 61% while we estimate 32%.  For 
sheep beef our estimated losses are high relative to MAF but almost identical to Meat and Wool NZ 
(which uses a lower profit figure to MAF). We do not believe ours are more accurate than either alternative 
method but we are able to explore other analyses using our method.   16 
 
Table 2: On-farm impact of $25 per tonne CO2-e with no free allocation 
Sector  Emissions 
Liability 
($) 2006 
Liability as % cash 
profit 





2006  2008  2001 - 
2008 
average 
2006  2008 
Sheep/beef  $40,000  49%  94%  162%  33%  44%  56% 
Dairy  $36,000  26%  32%  10%  17%  19%  7.1% 







22,000  100% 
South Island 
Deer 
24,000  53% 
Canterbury 
Arable 
  29.3% 
Bay of Plenty 
Kiwifruit 
  9.8% 
Hawkes Bay 
Pipfruit 




  37% 
SI Greenhouse 
Tomatoes 
  99% 
Marlborough 
Viticulture 
  1% 
 
 
2.1.3  Effects of different carbon prices 
With no behavioural response, changes in carbon prices simply alter the dollar 
value of liability linearly. A $50 price with no free allocation would make the average 
sheep/beef operation marginally economically profitable (or not) leading to significant 
land use change, and might drive many sheep/beef and deer operators out of business as 
a result of negative cash surpluses. The average dairy farm would lose around 50% of 
economic profit. 
2.1.4  Regional and farm class differences in impacts 
  In this section we consider dairy and sheep/beef alone because we have 
detailed modelling on those. In Table 3  we see that for the dairy sector, ignoring 
Taranaki where data only covers 2007-08, the regional differences are not great. Regional    
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differences are greater for cash profit than for economic profit. For example, it appears 
that farmers in the Waikato and Lower North Island are more heavily indebted relative 
to their profit levels. Data for all years is given in Appendix A. 
 
Table 3: Dairy by region:  Average impacts on economic and cash profit from 2001-2008, at $25 per 























Northland  $951  $721  $679  $449  -24%  -34% 
Waikato Bay of Plenty  $1,156  $866  $575  $284  -25%  -51% 
Taranaki9 $2,484    $2,215  $1,863  $1,594  -11%  -14% 
Lower North Island  $1,279  $995  $732  $447  -22%  -39% 
Canterbury  $2,251  $1,915  $1,399  $1,064  -15%  -24% 
Southland  $1,965  $1,671  $1,151  $857  -15%  -26% 
National  $1,432  $1,141  $781  $490  -20%  -37% 
 
For sheep/beef farming, we see in Tables 4 and 5 that the average impacts on 
profit over the last eight years are much more variable. Cash losses vary from 32% to 
180% at a $25 CO2-e price (Table 5). Losses of economic profit range from 14% to 79% 
(Table 4). Table 6 provides results that are directly comparable to the dairy results in 
Table 3. The large differences primarily arise between farm classes (columns) rather than 
between regions (rows).
10
  Of course no commercial farm will actually suffer a loss of economic profit of 
more than 100% in an ongoing sense – they will change their land use or simply abandon 
the land. The lowest the economic profit can go is the value in the next alternative use 
which will be forestry, indigenous regeneration or potentially development for lifestyle or 
tourist uses. 
  Regional differences within farm class are more similar to 
differences between dairy regions. These numbers assume that hill farms which face the 
highest percentage losses are unable to pass any of their costs on to the more intensive 
farms. In fact the cost of lambs that are sold from farms that are focused more on 
breeding (e.g. hill farms), to intensive finishing farms, is likely to rise to reflect the higher 
costs of carrying ewes. This rise in output price for breeding farms and input cost for 
finishing farms will reduce the profit impact differences across farm classes.   
                                                            
9 Taranaki data is available only for 2007-08. 
10 The definitions of farm classes are given in Table 15 in the Appendix.   18 
 
Table 4: Sheep/beef – % change in economic profit by region and class:  Average (2001-2008) at 
$25 per tonne CO2-e 
  Class 
Region  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
East Coast      61%  38%  32%      
Taranaki-Manawatu      48%  40%  38%      
Northland-Waikato-BoP      49%  41%  27%      
Marlborough-Canterbury  67%  54%       41%   14% 
Otago/Southland  79%  48%       35%  30%  
New Zealand  70%  50%  52%  39%  31%  38%  30%  14% 
 
Table 5: Sheep/beef – % change in cash profit by region and class: Average(2000-2007) at $25 per 
tonne CO2-e 
  Class 
Region  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
East Coast      88%  52%  43%      
Taranaki-Manawatu      93%  54%  41%      
Northland-Waikato-BoP      71%  57%  34%      
Marlborough-Canterbury  94%  79%       65%   32% 
Otago/Southland  180%  61%       44%  36%  
New Zealand  116%  73%  83%  55%  39%  54%  36%  32% 
 
Table 6: Sheep/Beef by class: average impacts on economic and cash profit from 2001-2008, at $25 
per tonne CO2-e, in 2007 dollars 






















1  $16  $5  $9  -$2  -68%  -122% 
2  $90  $49  $62  $21  -46%  -66% 
3  $170  $90  $98  $18  -47%  -82% 
4  $272  $174  $180  $82  -36%  -54% 
5  $382  $273  $281  $171  -29%  -39% 
6  $240  $154  $162  $76  -36%  -53% 
7  $455  $336  $329  $210  -26%  -36% 
8  $511  $441  $223  $153  -14%  -32% 
National  $211  $137  $139  $64  -35%  -54% 
Note: for each class, the figures are weighted average across regions. 
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2.1.5  Regional impacts on communities 
The primary impacts will be on farmers and farm values, but as farmers reduce 
their local labour demand and expenditures local communities will also face impacts. The 
intensity of these impacts will depend partly on the extent of farming in their local area 
but also on alternative employment opportunities and sources of consumer demand in 
the area. An isolated area that is dominated by pastoral farming will be more severely 
affected that an area with the same amount of farming that is on the edge of a town with 
a wider range of economic activities.   
Sin et al (2005) estimated the impact of the introduction of a price for carbon 
on agricultural emissions in New Zealand through a rural land use change model, Land 
Use in Rural New Zealand-climate (LURNZ-climate). They mapped these direct impacts 
on a map of labour market areas, which are areas defined so that most people who live 
there work there and most people who work there live there. Labour market areas are 
better units of analysis than territorial authorities which have arbitrary boundaries.  
For example, the use of labour market areas will make a large difference 
around Hamilton where the territorial authority is narrowly defined around the urban 
area while the labour market area is broader. Many people who live in the heavily 
affected rural areas around Hamilton city will have the opportunity to seek work in 
Hamilton city if they lose their rural jobs. 
Figure 3:  Territorial authority map 
 
Territorial Authorities  ------  
Labour Market Areas   ------  
overlap                        ------ 
Hamilton city (TA)    
Hamilton Labour Market Area  
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Grimes and Young (2009) find that the characteristics around the area that 
suffers a shock are important for how that area is affected. They found that the impacts 
of such a charge, whether through a trading system or carbon charge, would differentially 
hurt different communities. In the South Island, Gore and the Mackenzie District would 
be the hardest hit per person by the introduction of this policy while Taihape, 
Waipukurau, Te Kuiti and Dannevirke are the most affected in the North Island.  
In many respects, for example median income, ethnic mix, and percentage of 
working people with a university degree, the rural areas most affected have very similar 
socio-economic characteristics to other parts of rural New Zealand. Only in two ways do 
they appear to differ. Their findings indicate that areas with high emission costs tend to 
have high employment rates, but that they also have a disproportionately high number of 
unqualified people.   
Updating this analysis we found very similar regional effects with the per 
capita impacts by community summarised in Figure 4. Complete data and a map of total 
emission liability for each community are given in the Appendix. 
Figure 4: Emission liability per capita within each LMA, in 2007 dollars, average over 2001-2008 
 
 
All these analyses have shown the direct impact on farms and given indicators 
of the flow-on impacts on communities assuming that farmers to do not respond to the 
emissions price (and that there is no free allocation). 
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2.2  What are potential and likely behavioural responses? 
We begin this section by comparing the simulated farm impacts above with 
New Zealand’s experience with the agricultural reforms of the mid 1980s. We then look 
at other empirical evidence that directly explores each of the possible behavioural 
responses: land use change, on-farm mitigation and new technology, and general 
equilibrium responses. 
2.2.1  What can we learn from history? The effects of withdrawing the government 
farm subsidies in 1984 
The effects on farms of an emissions charge could resemble the effects of 
withdrawing the government subsidies to farming after 1984; both represent a substantial 
drop in the farm gate price of agriculture products. Table 7 shows estimates of the 
producer equivalent subsidies and how they fell over time. The subsidies were at a peak 
around 1983/84 for sheep. They were lower for wool, beef and dairy and peaked earlier. 
The two separate estimates for sheep meat are quite different in the critical period. Given 
the timing of the estimates, Tyler and Lattimore (1990) may more accurately reflect what 
was expected during the period. We consider the impacts of each. 
 
Table 7: Producer Subsidy Equivalents 
    % increase in farmer returns 
  Sheepa  Sheep b  Wool  Beef  Dairy 
1980  14  15  10  5  32 
1981  14  15  10  17  10 
1982  23.4  36  26  24  17 
1983  54.6  84  30  19  18 
1984  58.5  90  19  13  13 
1985  52  80  10  9  11 
1986  48.8  75  14  16  16 
1987  16  16  11  13  14 
1988  14  14  11  12  12 
1989  8  8  5  5  5 
1990  5  5  3  3  3 
a.  Anderson et al (2007); b. Tyler and Lattimore (1990) (based on MAF and AERU data).  
Data from Anderson et al (2007) in Appendix Table 6b: Nominal rates of assistance (including product-
specific subsidies), all agricultural products, New Zealand, annual, 1955 to 2005.   
 
Examining farm profitability changes pre-  and post-  the subsidy removal 
could help predict the changes that might be caused by an emissions charge. We consider 
only the impacts on the sheep-beef sector as we have consistent long term data on 
profitability in that sector. Anecdotally, there were widespread effects, concentrated 
particularly in the sheep farming sector, and the transition took at least six years.      22 
“It is estimated that around 800 farmers—or 1% of the total number of commercial farmers in 
operation—were forced to leave the land. Sheep farmers, who as a group were the most heavily 
subsidized, were (not surprisingly) hardest hit by the elimination of subsidies. Those farmers 
who were heavily in debt at the start of the reform period were hit hard by rising interest rates, 
and a transition program was negotiated to ease their situation. Farm-related sectors like 
packing and processing, equipment and chemical supply, and off-farm transport also suffered, 
but this was regarded as evidence of their previous inefficiency. Overall the ‘transition period’ 
lasted about six years, with land values, commodity prices, and farm profitability indices 




Figure 5: Changes in average EBIT over the reform period 
 
 
Figure 5 shows that average sheep beef farm EBIT fell 33% from the period 
1980/81-1984/85 to 1985/86-1989/90. Is this what would have been expected in 1984? 
To provide roughly comparable impact numbers for the subsidy removal to those 
calculated above for the impact of emissions trading, we first construct an average farm 
for the period from 1980/81 to 1984/85 (the control period) by averaging all aspects of 
their budget over the period. We then, for each year from 1985/86 to 1990/91 reduce 
revenue from each product (wool, sheep, cattle, grain etc.) in our ‘average farm’ 
according to the reduction in equivalent producer subsidy relative to the control period. 
Thus simulated EBIT from 1985/86 to 1998/90 is calculated by simulated revenue from 
1985/86 to 1998/90 minus average cost from 1980/81 to 1984/85. This approach 
replicates the methodology we use to estimate the impacts of the ETS as closely as 
possible.  
                                                            






















Average EBIT   
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In reality,  the reduction in subsidy is a combination of reduced revenue and 
changes in costs because withdrawing  agricultural subsidies was part of a wider 
programme removing protection. We are assuming a specific form of expectations about 
revenue net of subsidies. In fact it would have been hard to determine the level of net 
subsidy in advance.  
We are using the PSEs as though they were a planned path of subsidy removal 
rather than an ex-post estimate of the actual path of subsidies. The actual path will 
embody some behavioural responses by farmers such as changes in input mix. For 
example, as fertiliser subsidies were removed, farmers would have used less fertiliser. 
This will make the apparent impact on cost higher than the real loss of benefit to 
farmers, particularly if they were using more fertiliser than was optimal simply because it 
was so heavily subsidised.   
The lowest dashed curve in Figure 6 suggests that, with no response by farmers, 
farm economic profit should have fallen by 37% by 1991, relative to the period 1980-85 
(according to the Anderson et al estimates and around 45% according to Tyler and 
Lattimore estimates). In contrast, actual EBIT fell by 33% in the first year and then more 
or less stabilised at an average EBIT 30% lower than the period 1980-85. 
 
Figure 6: National actual revenue, cost, EBIT per ha and simulated EBIT, in 2008 dollars 
 


























Simulated EBIT A et al
Simulated EBIT T&L  24 
 
Part of the difference between simulated and actual EBIT in the first few years 
may simply be data timing. However, in addition, between 1985 and 1986, both export 
prices and volumes for sheep fell significantly so that the export value of sheep meat fell 
by 30% in one year. Actual costs also fell more slowly than revenue, leading to initially 
overshooting EBIT loss. 
The longer term difference between the estimated and actual impact seems likely 
to be at least partly behavioural response. Some of this response may be implicitly built 
into the later Anderson et al (2007) estimates. The simulated impacts were 34-100% 
greater than the long run actual impacts. This is a reassuring result, but more analysis is 
needed to understand exactly how farmers responded in order to know whether those 
responses can be repeated and how costly the responses themselves were. The net cost 
also hides high individual costs including to the estimated 1% of farmers who had to 
leave their land. Some of these farmers will have gone bankrupt while their farms 
continued to operate. 
 
Table 8: Actual percentage changes in real EBIT per ha in 1989/90 relative to 80/81 – 84/85 
average 
  Class                 
Production Region  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
East Coast      -45.1%  -44.0%  -48.1%        -43.3% 
Marlborough-Canterbury  79.1%  2.9%        -19.1%    -9.6%  -1.9% 
Northland-Waikato-BoP      -9.9%  -8.8%  -41.5%        -19.7% 
Otago/Southland  37.2%          -13.4%  -7.8%    -3.4% 
Taranaki-Manawatu      -22.1%  -31.9%  -29.7%        -31.7% 
New Zealand  64.2%  10.1%  -31.7%  -29.6%  -41.2%  -15.7%  -7.8%  -9.6%  -17.0% 
 
 
In Table 8 the farm EBIT pre- and post-1984/85 is broken into regions and 
classes. We do not have separate subsidy estimates for different farm classes. The PSE 
would vary because of the different cost structures. Applying the same estimate of 
subsidy withdrawal in Table 9 shows how the simulated impact varies across farm 
classes.  EBIT for classes 1 and 2 actually grew during this period – possibly because they 
are heavily focused on wool production (although our predictions in Table 9 do account 
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Table 9: Predicted percentage changes in real EBIT per ha in 1989/90 relative to 80/81 – 84/85 
average 
  Class                 
Production Region  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
East Coast      -48.6%  -38.4%  -42.6%        -40.9% 
Marlborough-
Canterbury 
-43.4%  -51.6%        -47.2%    -22.4%  -25.4% 
Northland-Waikato-
BoP 
    -42.5%  -43.9%  -41.2%        -42.5% 
Otago/Southland  -52.0%          -56.1%  -38.0%    -46.2% 
Taranaki-Manawatu      -53.3%  -40.1%  -38.1%        -41.6% 
New Zealand  -41.0%  -50.0%  -46.8%  -39.3%  -41.1%  -49.9%  -38.0%  -22.4%  -37.2% 
 
By taking the difference between the two tables above, Table 10 suggests that 
behavioural responses to the subsidy withdrawal helped farmers to reduce economic 
profit losses by 20% nationally. Farms in the South Island (Class 1, 2, 6, 7 and 8) seemed 
to respond more than in the North Island. Differences at a regional level may  however 
reflect the different regional effects of policy as well as behavioural responses. This needs 
to be explored in more depth. 
Table 10: Difference between actual and simulated percentage change in real EBIT 
  Class                 
Production Region  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
East Coast      3.5%  -5.6%  -5.5%        -2.4% 
Marlborough-Canterbury  122.4%  54.5%        28.2%    12.8%  23.5% 
Northland-Waikato-BoP      32.6%  35.2%  -0.2%        22.8% 
Otago/Southland  89.2%          42.7%  30.2%    42.8% 
Taranaki-Manawatu      31.1%  8.2%  8.4%        9.9% 
New Zealand  105.2%  60.1%  15.2%  9.7%  -0.1%  34.1%  30.2%  12.8%  20.1% 
 
Overall, if we had used the producer subsidy equivalent estimates to simulate the 
impact of the reforms on agriculture from 1985 forward, we would have overestimated 
the damage to farm EBIT. We will need to explore the causes of this difference further 
to understand whether this seemingly successful adaptation of the agricultural sector to 
change could be repeated in response to emissions trading. 
Withdrawal of subsidies involves different levels of uncertainty than does the 
imposition of a greenhouse gas price. Also the options for mitigation are quite different 
now than the options for response were in 1984.  What are the current options for 
greenhouse gas mitigation? 
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2.2.2  Greenhouse gas on-farm mitigation options 
Table 11 lists the options that have a strong scientific basis and are possible to 
include in the National Inventory in the short term.
12
 
 We explore the potential use of 
these options.  
Table 11: Pastoral farming options that could reduce agricultural emissions in a reasonably well-
determined way in the short term 
Methane 
Reduce animal numbers and / or output 
Increase output per unit of dry matter intake 
•  reduce replacement rate – higher reproduction; more milking years  
•  faster growing animals for meat 
•  smaller breeding animals including cows 




Reduce animal numbers and / or output 
Increase output per unit of dry matter intake – as above   
Nitrification inhibitors 
Manipulate diet 
Cattle winter management:  
•  stand off / feed pads 
•  moving livestock production to lower emissions locations – including wintering 
off (within or off a farm) 
 
2.2.3  Potential to change land use and hence output 
The most recent simulations from Motu’s Land Use in Rural New Zealand 
(LURNZ) model (Shepherd et al, 2008) suggest nationally that with a $25 CO2-e price, by 
2015 we could lose around 33,047 ha of dairy (2% of current dairy; 38% less growth 
from 2007) relative to the reference case (i.e. still significant growth in absolute terms); 
we could lose 242,000 ha more sheep and beef farms (3.6% of current sheep/beef land; 
108% more decline from 2007);  and we could have around 260,000 ha more 
scrub/regenerating native forest. In Shepherd et al we did not model the impact of the 
return to plantation forestry because we were not comfortable with the robustness of our 
empirical results. The model is roughly linear in response, so doubling the price would 
roughly double the impact. We do not include any land use change or output reduction 
                                                            
12 This list was generated with advice from Cecile deKlein, Frank Kelliher and Harry Clark at AgResearch.    
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results at $50 per tonne, however, as this would be such a large structural change in the 
economy that it is outside of the scope of current models to predict with any confidence.  
MAF (2008b) studies the potential for sheep and beef farmers to offset some 
of their emissions through forestry. At $25 per tonne they estimate that farmers can 
reduce their profit loss by between one half (simply offsetting livestock emissions – 8.7% 
of land into forestry) and two thirds (converting 20% to forestry).  
  Meat and Wool New Zealand work suggests that the area required to offset 
emissions varies considerably by farm class: from around 1% to 15% and the highest 
percentages are required on the most productive land. For many farms it will not make 
sense to offset emissions on their own farm both because they may have high quality 
land and because, if they are considering plantation forestry, they may not have good 
access, appropriate slopes for harvesting or the appropriate scale for efficient forestry. 
Thus while this is a potential mitigation option for the country and a potential 
opportunity for some farmers with appropriate land, it is not a general mitigation option. 
Farmers have this option now as a result of the forestry component of the ETS – it will 
simply become more attractive as returns fall in sheep and beef farming. 
  Several commentators have pointed out that forestry provides an offset for 
only around 30 years. At that point either the farmer faces a liability if they harvest and 
replant (of around 80% of the original offset if replanting; 100% if not) or must decide to 
leave it permanently in forest and bear temporary liability when the radiata forest ages 
and loses carbon while it transitions to a more sustainable forest. If they want to offset 
emissions after this, they must put more land into forest. 
  Forestry is also risky both because forests can blow down or (less often) burn 
and because returns if harvested are highly uncertain. Plantation forests also face 
resource consent issues in some areas because of water use and aesthetics. Forestry 
planting rates are generally well below those that are suggested by simple models of the 
relative profitability of plantations relative to marginal sheep and beef farming probably 
as a result of these hidden costs. The increased return to woody biofuels may increase 
forestry profitability and lower its risk but this option is still in development (Todd et al, 
2008). 
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2.2.4  Ability to reduce production intensity and hence output 
The Agribusiness Group et al (2007) estimated the impacts on profitability 
from reducing intensity (measured as % reductions in stocking rates) on a range of MAF 
farms. We have combined these with our earlier analysis of emissions liabilities (Table 3 
and Table 6) to estimate the gains to farms from responding to GHG costs by reducing 
intensity. 
Table 12 shows that reducing intensity by 10% is not profitable for any of the 
modelled farms at $25 but may be for an average Waikato dairy and average Central 
North Island Hill sheep and beef farm at $50.
13
Table  12: Profitability impacts of reducing stocking rates by 10% in response to $25 and $50 
charge (2005/06) 
 These results are dependent on specific 
assumptions and are only for one year’s prices. They do not estimate very small 
reductions in stocking rates which could possibly be profitable. They are also calculated 
simply by changing stocking rates and hence output per animal and variable farm 
operating costs – thus they do not have the full sophistication of a potential change in 
farming system which would affect many variables. Emissions are assumed to be 
proportional to output. 




% fall in 
output*  gain at $ 25†  gain at $50† 
Waikato Dairy  $103,964  $33,010  4%  -$1,014  $374 
Canterbury Dairy  $272,338  $48,718  11%  -$55,520  -$50,400 
Waikato Intensive Sheep Beef  $104,662  $28,600  7%  -$5,821  -$3,877 
Central North Island Hill  $206,049  $79,474  8%  -$6,368  $73 
Southland Otago Hill farm  $93,675  $36,739  7%  -$15,073  -$12,347 
*From tables 3 and 6; **From Agribusiness et al.; † inferred from combination of both 
Barry Ridler did new work for MAF using a linear programming model which 
allows continuous and more flexible responses (McCall et al, 1999). His work suggests 
that at $7 per kilo milk solid payout, reoptimising a Waikato dairy farm to respond to an 
emissions charge on output leads to very little response and hence gain in profit. The 
emissions liability and hence loss of profit is reduced by 1.5%. At higher payouts he 
found larger responses. 
  Results from AgResearch modelling by Smeaton and deKlein (2008) 
using Udder (a dairy farm system model) on the same farm broadly confirm this at a $7 
payout. They find that the farm should not be using supplements. Because marginal 
                                                            
13 Reducing intensity becomes even less profitable as the % reduction increases.      
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output is provided using N fertiliser which is cheap, marginal output is highly profitable 
and the emissions charge does not alter output. At very low payouts it may be profitable 
to cut back on N and output. At higher payouts (above $7), marginal production would 
use supplements. Because these are more expensive and because they have diminishing 
marginal value, output is more likely to be sensitive to emissions payouts. Thus Ridler 
and Smeaton and deKlein’s results on stocking rate changes broadly confirm the work by 
the Agribusiness group. 
Smeaton and deKlein (2008) explore a number of different farm systems 
which vary in production intensity in ways that are not limited to changes in stocking 
rate.  The details of the systems are given in Table 19 in the Appendix. Figure 7 
orders the farm systems by intensity of production. The base case is normalised to 100 
for all three variables: production intensity, baseline profit and profit with emissions 
charge. All systems are more profitable than the base (actual) system both with and 
without the greenhouse gas charge.   
  While all systems are less profitable with the greenhouse gas charge 
than without, the most profitable alternative system is so much more profitable than 
the current system that, according to the model, farmers could alter their systems 
under a $25 per tonne emission charge and be more profitable than they are at present 
with no charge. The fact that they have not yet changed systems suggests either 
barriers to or costs of implementing the new farm system that are not incorporated in 
the model, uncertainty about the benefits and risks of the new system, or irrationally 
slow adoption of the new system. These barriers will not automatically disappear with 
a greenhouse gas charge but it may increase the incentives to overcome them. 
  Some of the systems analysed are more intensive and some less. The 
three most profitable systems are more intensive. This suggests that there are 
currently incentives to intensify in dairy. The emissions charge makes the two most 
profitable systems even more attractive relative to the base case but also increases the 
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Figure 7: Relative profitability across dairy farm systems with different levels of productivity and 
as the ETS is implemented ($25 per tonne CO2-e with no free allocation; $6 dairy payout). 
 
 
Figure 7 is done for one dairy payout and one greenhouse gas charge. As the GHG 
charge rises relative to payout, the least intensive system becomes relatively most 
profitable. This occurred, for example, when payout was $6, and GHG charge was 
greater than $218 per tonne of CO2-e. With lower payouts, the critical value of the 
GHG charge could be much lower. 
  In contrast, for sheep-beef farming (Central North Island King 
Country), in Figure 8 we can see that all alternative farm systems are both more 
intensive and more profitable than the base farm though the slightly more intensive 
farms have basically the same profit. The application of the $25 charge reduces the 
incentive to intensify, especially on the least intensive alternatives. At a high carbon 
price (around $90) the base case becomes the most profitable system (not shown).   
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Figure 8: Relative profitability across sheep beef farm systems with different levels of productivity 
and as the ETS is implemented ($25 per tonne CO2-e with no free allocation). 
 
 
2.2.5  General equilibrium modelling 
General equilibrium (GE) analysis should pick up both land use change and 
changes in intensity of land use, but through responsiveness of total production to prices 
rather than directly. The New Zealand GE models are not ideally suited for this analysis 
as they were primarily developed for different types of analysis. 
Most New Zealand GE analysis of emissions trading has been done by Adolf 
Stroombergen at Infometrics (e.g. Stroombergen et al, 2007; Stroombergen et al, 2009). 
His 2007 modelling suggests that at NZ$25/tonne with no free allocation, sheep and 
beef real gross output falls 3.4% relative to business as usual, and dairy farming falls by 
2.5%. At $100, sheep and beef would be down 12.1% and dairy down 9.5% from 
business as usual. 
MAF did some work using the OECD AgLink model (Conforti and Londero, 
2001) and their Pastoral Supply Response Model (Gardiner and Su, 2003). The following 
is excerpted from their report (MAF, 2007).   32 




 and nitrogen fertiliser prices.  Given that the impacts of the ETS will 
be spread across all agriculture industries and that land use options are limited in some areas, it 
is unclear whether the impacts on output will be as great as shown, at least in the short run.  
Previous experience shows that farm businesses may well attempt to maintain output, absorbing 
increased costs through reduced input use and/or by supplementing with off-farm income.’  
Table 13: MAF estimated output impacts 1 
OUTPUT IMPACTS  Carbon price  Full Pricing 
        
Milk   $15  -3.80% 
   $50  -12.70% 
        
Beef   $15  -3.00% 
   $50  -10.00% 
        
Sheep meat    $15  -0.60% 
   $50  -2.10% 
        
Venison 2  $15  -5.35% 
   $50  -9.49% 
1.  These represent the estimated changes in farm output as a result of changes in supply price before 
account is taken of possible additional longer run changes in land use due to switches to non-
pastoral farming activities such as forestry. 
2.  The output impacts for venison were estimated using a different model (the Pastoral Supply 
Response Model) because OECD Aglink does not model deer. 
 
These results suggest somewhat higher reductions in milk production (around 
6.3% at $25) than other models. Beef production would fall around 5% (consistent with 
fewer dairy farms) at $25 but sheep meat is anticipated to fall by only around 1%. When 
combined, these are of a similar total size to the other models’ predictions for meat.   
NZIER
15
                                                            
14 The indirect impacts of increased energy costs throughout the supply chain have not been taken into 
account 
 produced some new results for this report. These results, shown in 
Table 14, suggest even lower impacts on output at $25 than the previous models: less 
than 2% reduction in all sectors. They suggest that many horticultural activities will 
benefit from the ETS. 
15 John Stephenson, personal communication.    
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Table 14: NZIER: Changes in industry value added, $25 per tonne, no free allocation 
Agricultural Sector  % change relative to BAU 
Sheep Beef  -1.541 
Dairy Cattle  -1.205 
Other Farming  -0.532 
Agricultural Services  -0.347 
Meat    -1.181 
Dairy Production    -1.138 
Other Horticulture  0.185 
Apple and Pear  1.264 
Kiwifruit  0.101 
Other Fruit  0.126 
Mixed Farming  0.018 
 
2.2.6  Reducing emissions per unit output 
The only current option for mitigating methane per unit output is increasing 
productivity (output per unit dry matter input) beyond business as usual. We know that 
productivity varies significantly across farms but do not have strong evidence on the 
drivers and to what extent they will be responsive to GHG costs.  
The only strong evidence on the potential profitability of mitigation through 
raising productivity comes from Smeaton and deKlein (2008). For dairy, in Figure 9 we 
can see that production on most alternative more profitable farm systems has lower 
emissions intensity than the base case and that the ETS increases this effect. The greatest 
increase in relative profitability with the implementation of the ETS comes in the second 
lowest GHG per unit output system which is also the most profitable system. Thus the 
ETS does not change the order of attractiveness of the farm systems but increases the 
existing incentives to move toward a more GHG efficient system.   
Over time, this response will reduce the impact of the GHG charge on dairy 
farmers but we cannot say how rapidly or how extensively this new system would be 
adopted. All the systems modelled were chosen so that it would be possible in the long 
run for all New Zealand farms to adopt this system – for example, they do not winter off 
any animals because that would imply that other farms must have more animals in winter 
than currently. The lowest GHG emissions intensity farm has large birthweight animals 
(for example, Friesian bulls), which could not immediately be implemented on all farms 
but could be implemented with selective breeding over approximately a decade.   34 
 
Figure 9: Dairy: relative profitability across farm systems ordered by GHG emissions intensity per 
unit output16
Source:  Derived from Smeaton and deKlein (2008). 
 
 
Similarly, Smeaton and deKlein have modelled a range of systems on 
sheep/beef farms. In Figure 10 we see that all but one alternative farm system has lower 
greenhouse gas intensity than the base case. The most profitable farm systems have 
emissions per unit output that are 17% lower than the base case. Despite this, these 
systems become relatively less attractive with the emissions trading system because they 
are more intensive. Thus if sheep/beef farmers respond to the GHG charge by staying in 
or moving to less intensive systems, they will not benefit from a fall in GHG intensity 
and hence emissions liability per unit output.   
                                                            
16 Emissions as measured in scenario 4 without application of DCDs.    
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Figure  10: Sheep/beef:  relative profitability across farm systems ordered by GHG emissions 
intensity per unit output17
Source:  Derived from Smeaton and deKlein (2008). 
 
 
2.2.6.a  Nitrification inhibitors 
MAF (2008b) looks at the role that nitrification inhibitors can have to reduce 
the financial impact of the emissions trading system on dairy farms. Nitrification 
inhibitors reduce nitrous oxide emissions and raise pasture productivity.  The nitrification 
inhibitors work uses effectiveness estimates that may overestimate the impacts in some 
regions. They assume 100% uptake on dairy farms outside of Northland and the West 
Coast. They assume 50% in direct nitrous oxide emissions per kilo of milk solids for 
excreta and fertiliser for 5 months and 35% reduction in nitrous oxide per kilo of milk 
solids through leaching for five months. They either use the productivity impact to 
increase milk solid production by 10% or hold production constant. They find that at 
$25 per tonne CO2-e, the reduction in profit in 06/07 as a result of the ETS reduces 
from 61% to around 20%. However, their analysis suggests that nitrification inhibitors 
should be adopted regardless of the carbon price, so these should really be included in 
their business as usual case, reducing the direct impact over time rather than considered 
as a response. 
                                                            
17 Emissions as measured in scenario 4 without application of DCDs.   36 
The Agribusiness Group et al (2007) explores the effect on nitrates rather than 
nitrous oxide, but the effects are correlated. They find that dairy farmers should adopt 
nitrification inhibitors in Waikato and Canterbury even without a GHG charge but that 
they are costly on sheep and beef and deer farms. Their current analysis does not allow 
us to assess adoption in response to nitrous oxide prices but they are currently working 
on similar analysis for greenhouse gases. 
Barry Ridler (McCall et al, 1999)  uses a linear programming model with the 
same set of effectiveness assumptions for a Waikato dairy farm and finds that the 
nitrification inhibitors would not be profitably adopted. The reason for the difference 
between his result and the MAF result appears to be that he has a time sensitive model 
and the boost in productivity from the N inhibitors that drives its profitability comes at a 
time that is of low value to farms – i.e. mostly in spring when there is no shortage of 
grass.   
  Smeaton and deKlein (2008) found that using DCDs (a nitrification inhibitor) 
may on average be marginally profitable for dairy farms even without a GHG charge. 
Two of their farm systems significantly benefit from DCDs and the reduction in GHG 
charge the farm would benefit from if they use DCDs.  One farm system that benefits 
from DCDs is the lowest GHG intensity, highest profit system.  For this farm system the 
GHG charge provides yet another incentive to mitigate which is encouraging. The other 
farm system that benefits from DCDs, however, is a high GHG intensity system with the 
second highest profit. Thus the existence of DCDs will likely reduce greenhouse gas 
intensity within existing farm systems (in the  business as usual  scenario) but could 
encourage farmers to move toward either high or low GHG intensity systems. The net 
effect on mitigation in response to the GHG charge is ambiguous.   
2.2.6.b  Other options that mitigate emissions per unit output 
•  Feed/standoff pads  
 The Agribusiness Group et al (2007) finds that standoff pads are profitable on the 
Waikato and Canterbury dairy farms they study even with a zero carbon price. The net 




 Standoff pads are unprofitable on sheep and beef farms.  
                                                            
18 Cecile deKlein – personal communication.    
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•  Manipulate diet 
We do not have the science basis to model this accurately yet. 
•  Move livestock production to lower emission soils (wintering off) 
We do not have any modelling results for this currently. It requires a regional model to 
take account of emissions on the farms to which the stock are moved, and the transport 
costs of moving them. 
 
2.2.7  Effects of mitigation in general equilibrium 
 Infometrics  ran two scenarios (13 and 14) to consider the impacts of 
mitigation in agriculture. These do not predict mitigation potential but, assuming a given 
level of technology-driven mitigation, explore the impacts on the sector and the wider 
economy. Both scenarios assume a price of NZ$100 and no free allocation. 
1.  Reductions in methane emissions per unit output of 10% in dairy, beef and sheep 
farming, brought about by breeding for lower emissions; 
2.  Reductions in nitrous oxide emissions per unit output of 11% in dairy farming, 
and 2% in sheep and beef farming brought about by the use of nitrification 
inhibitors.  
These reductions in emissions are not intended to be precise forecasts of what 
will occur; they are order of magnitude estimates of what is considered by MAF to be 
plausible under a carbon price of $100 (or less) per tonne of CO2-e. As the section above 
suggests, some nitrification inhibitors could be adopted even without a CO2 price.  
With no mitigation, a NZ$100 CO2 price is estimated to reduce emissions of 
both methane and nitrous oxide by nearly 11%, achieved almost exclusively by 
reductions in agricultural output. Incorporating the two technological advances (breeding 
for lower methane emission and using nitrification inhibitors) raises these figures to 
around 19% for methane and 15% for nitrous oxide respectively.  
A fall in methane emissions of 10% with no behavioural response translates to 
a reduction of only 8% after behaviour responds. This is because the reduced emissions 
intensity is roughly equivalent to a 10% fall in CO2  price. Some of the effect of 
nitrification inhibitors will also be offset by a behavioural response both because of the 
lower effective CO2 price per unit (modelled) and because of the increase in pasture 
productivity (not modelled).     38 
The new technologies would, by assumption, lower emissions liabilities. In 
absolute terms, improved breeding reduces emissions, and hence emissions liability, in 
2025 by 4.9 Mt (CO2-e), with nitrogen inhibitors reducing emissions by 2.8 Mt. 
2.3  Summary of evidence on impacts  
  At $25, with no free allocation and no behavioural response, the on-farm 
impacts on dairy economic profit would be around 20% (with off-farm impacts an 
additional 3% of profit); the on-farm impacts on the average sheep/beef farm (and 
possibly deer are similar) would be around 40%. This hides some variation by region and 
enormous differences across classes of sheep-beef farms as well as variation between 
individual properties. These impacts may have a concentrated effect in some rural, 
relatively isolated communities. At $50, with no free allocation or behavioural response, 
dairy loses around 40% of economic profit and the average sheep and beef farm may be 
non-viable. 
  The evidence in the sections above suggests that at $25 per tonne CO2-e, the 
combination of land use change and reduced intensity of land use might reduce dairy 
output by between 1 and 6% relative to business as usual (still high growth) and 
combined sheep and beef output by around 3-4% (larger decline). Mostly this is driven 
by land use change, not by changes in intensity – so the landowner could receive some 
returns from the carbon by reverting to indigenous or plantation forestry. At high CO2-e 
prices, sheep beef farms may also be come less intensive. These reductions would reduce 
emissions liabilities commensurately and significantly reduce the losses to farmers. 
  The potential for reducing the impact through mitigation within current land 
uses is still highly unclear though there is some evidence that nitrification inhibitors could 
have a significant effect on farmers’ losses from the ETS. In the dairy sector there will be 
increased incentives to move toward new farming systems. These systems may be so 
much more profitable than the base farm that even with a $25 CO2-e price, they could be 
more profitable than the current base farm with no ETS. This begs the question of the 
barriers that explain why farmers are not moving to these apparently superior farm 
systems. This informs our decisions relating to the compensation and adjustment costs 
motivations. 
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2.4  How much is production likely to fall? 
  The flip side to the benefit of reducing emission liability by reducing output is 
that these reductions can have negative effects through economic regret, adjustment 
costs and affects on global food insecurity. At $25 the reduction in output does not 
appear to be very severe and with some assistance adjustment seems feasible for 
communities to bear.  At $50 the effects are much less predictable and could be severe 
for both farmers and communities.   
  Similarly, at $25 the likelihood of severe environmental leakage or damage to 
our long term infrastructure or skills base seems relatively low, but at $50 relatively 
irreversible large scale movements in land use may be induced in the sheep and beef 
sector.  We have no evidence on how these changes in production are likely to affect 
global food insecurity other than an indication that change is likely to be small at $25 per 
tonne. 
2.5  Adjustment costs 
New Zealand agriculture suffered a similar, though possibly larger, shock in 
the 1980s with the removal of protection. Adjustment costs at that time were severe. 
Some banks smoothed adjustment by protecting some viable farms from bankruptcy at 
least in the short term but many still went bankrupt and many small communities 
suffered. Have we learned anything about helping people and communities adjust after 
the mid-1980s experience? Four Motu papers are relevant for this.  
The first, Grimes et al (2007) looks at how migration mitigates the effect of a 
shock to a region. Much of the labour market effect of a shock is quickly mitigated 
through migration of excess labour. The second, Velamuri et al (2008) looks at the long 
run impacts of shocks. Some effects on average incomes in affected communities persist 
in the long term. Thus adjustment to shocks should be encouraged not hindered and 
some groups may need some long term assistance.  A third paper, Sin and Stillman 
(2005), suggests that the less mobile groups – who may suffer long term effects – tend to 
be older, less educated, and potentially Maori with strong local Iwi affiliations. Finally, 
current work, Grimes and Young (2009), finds that between two towns (Whakatu and 
Patea) that suffered similar employment shocks with the closure of meat works, the more 
isolated town (Patea) suffered the greatest disruption to long term employment rates and 
population.  
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Our criteria for assessing allocation options were: 
a.  Achieving the goals defined by the balance between the three objectives: 
i.  to partially compensate for losses   
ii.  to reduce damage from reductions in output 
iii.  to ease adjustment into the system.  
b.  Behavioural incentives.  
c.  Convenience – administrative feasibility (for farmer and government).  
The empirical work we have summarised gives us a clearer idea of who is 
affected, how easily they can offset that effect, how great leakage may be, and which 
communities and individual may suffer most from adjustment costs. These inform our 
weightings on the first criteria for choices among allocation options. The next section 
outlines key allocation options and assesses them against these criteria in a preliminary 
way. 
 
3  Allocation options 
3.1  What are key free allocation options? 
Allocation options can be categorised in terms of who receives allocations, on 
what basis they receive them, and how they change over time. 
3.1.1  Who are units allocated to? 
a.  Farmers – owners of farm businesses 
b.  Agricultural land owners 
c.  Processors 
d.  Other groups – e.g. agricultural workers or communities. 
The key distinctions between these options depend on how these groups 
overlap  -  for  instance,  whether processing companies are owned by farmers and by 
which farmers, and how wealth and prices are passed between these groups. If 
processing companies are owned by farmers (for example cooperatives), allocation to 
processors is a direct allocation to at least some farmers. If not, the benefit to farmers 
will depend on how wealth and costs are passed from processors to farmers. The latter 
will depend on market structures and legal relationships.     
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Ideally, allocation will be given directly to those whom the system aims to 
compensate,  whose adjustment it aims to ease, and where  it aims to encourage 
behavioural change. If the objective is partial compensation, this suggests allocating to 
landowners; if the objective is to avoid output reduction, this suggests allocating to the 
operators of farm businesses; and if community adjustment is of foremost concern, some 
allocation should go to local communities and workers.  
The most convenient group to give allocation to may depend on the point of 
obligation – who reports data and surrenders NZ units – because these actors will be 
registered and will be providing potentially relevant data. This criteria is especially 
relevant if the point of obligation is the processor, the objective of free allocation is 
partial compensation to landowners  and we are not sure that a free allocation to 
processors would be passed on to landowners. Only an allocation to landowners would 
directly  achieve the compensation  objective, but if the point of obligation is the 
processor the data on which an allocation to landowners is based may need to be simpler 
than it would be if the point of obligation were the landowner. The data used needs to 
take into account the cost of reporting and verifying data that is not needed for other 
purposes.
19
In contrast, if the objective is protection of output and the processing market 
is competitive, allocation could be provided to farmers through processors via a defined 
reduction in the emissions levy on output (if the processor is the point of obligation). 
Equivalently, allocation could be provided through a defined subsidy per unit of output 
(if the point of obligation is on the farm). Each is equally convenient because the 
allocation and data collection are co-located. If the processing market is not competitive, 
some of the value of the free allocation would not be passed on to farmers creating 
inefficiency; this is, however, a more general problem with the way prices are passed 
through non-competitive markets and is not specific to emissions trading. 
 
   
                                                            
19 Similarly, if the point of obligation were farm businesses or stock owners, in some cases, free allocation 
would need to go to the landowner from whom they lease land if the objective was to compensate them 
for loss of land value.  This would create administrative complexity.  If the objective were to reduce 
leakage, there would be no conflict.      42 
3.1.2  On what basis are allocations made? 
1.  Where allocation is fixed – does not change over time. 
a.  Exemptions – de minimus/threshold rules  
De minimus rules for free allocation  (for example,  not giving any free 
allocation to farms below a certain number of hectares), would be appropriate if 
allocation is to landowners and some landowners are exempt from the system. Those 
who do not bear cost under the system would not be compensated;  those whose 
production is not affected would not be protected. Otherwise it could be justified only by 
government’s administrative convenience concerns. Landowners’ applications can be 
voluntary, so the cost to them of applying for free allocation can never exceed the value 
of compensation.   
a.  Historical emissions or historical output 
Allocation could be based on historical data if the key motivation is partial 
compensation. If the point of obligation is processors,  and hence we do not have 
detailed farm level information, we can calculate emissions only through the proxies of 
output, region (if there are significant regional variations in emissions intensity),  and 
animal numbers as reported to the Inland Revenue Department. Thus the choice is how 
much of this information we would want to use. Liability will be proportional only to 
output if the point of obligation is the processor because they do not have access to 
other relevant data. 
If the farm is the point of obligation, using the same emissions calculation to 
assess allocation as will be used to calculate emissions liability will minimise adjustment 
costs and minimise incentives to distort the model that determines emissions liability.   
b.  Fixed land characteristics 
Because land values are likely to fall based on potential land use, not only 
current actual land use, using land characteristics as a basis for allocation rather than 
historical emissions or output is more closely aligned to addressing long-term losses in 
equity. This approach would particularly benefit those whose current land use is low 
intensity relative to its potential, for example some Maori land and some land that is 
currently in forestry. It would, however, require creating a formula linking fixed land 
characteristics to emissions liabilities, and may lead to some free allocation going to    
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currently forested land, both of which may be controversial.
20
2. Options where the allocation formula is updated over time 
 In addition, in the short 
term it will lead to higher adjustment costs because there will be greater differences 
between free allocations and emissions liability in the early years.  
a.  Current Output – i.e. updating 
Updating is appropriate only where we want the free allocation to alter 
behaviour.  If the free allocation is aimed at avoiding reductions in output, output is the 
appropriate basis for allocation. If the aim is to minimise long term economic losses 
arising from leakage (‘regret’) and the products are not facing significant import 
substitution pressure (such as for most meat and dairy products), output that is exported 
is the best target because that is the output most vulnerable to leakage. However, this 
essentially becomes a border rebate and may face legal issues. It is also technically 
challenging to relate exported products to meat and milk production.   
b.  Current emissions – progressive obligation  
This  creates  perverse incentives because it does not reward reductions in 
emissions intensity. Those who reduce the emissions intensity of their production are 
penalised because they receive fewer free NZ units. This option faces the same design 
challenges as current output-based allocation. 
 
4  Summary and conclusion 
Allocation of any free units within an emissions trading system is always the 
most politically contentious aspect of programme design. In the case of greenhouse gases 
from New Zealand agriculture, it potentially has economic and environmental effects 
(through emissions leakage and economic regret) as well as providing the potential to 
partially compensate some of those who bear disproportionate costs or who will find 
adjustment to change difficult. The empirical evidence suggests that for CO2-e prices of 
around $25 and no free allocation, the impacts on the profitability of dairy and sheep-
beef farms would be large. This will have particular impact on some farm classes (for 
example,  on extensive farms) and concentrated geographical impact in communities 
strongly dependent on pastoral agriculture. 
                                                            
20 This is however the approach being taken by Horizons Regional Council for regulation of nitrate loss 
and is being considered also for the Lake Rotorua catchment.  See Kerr and Lock (2009).   44 
The evidence suggests that there are, however, unlikely to be large changes in 
production intensity or land use as a result of a $25 price. At higher prices the empirical 
evidence becomes weaker and we are less confident at predicting effects. 
There are some options to mitigate emissions, particularly through increasing 
productivity. These do not substantially change the distributional picture in the short run; 
however, greenhouse gas charges will, on the whole, increase the incentive toward more 
intensive but lower greenhouse gas intensity production in the dairy sector (including 
uptake of nitrification inhibitors in some regions); and will decrease the incentive to 
intensify in the sheep/beef sector.    
Together, the evidence may suggest making allocation decisions with a greater 
emphasis on compensation motivations and assistance with adjustment in the most 
vulnerable communities. If the point of obligation is at farm level, this suggests allocation 
on a combination of historical output and fixed land characteristics as well as some direct 
assistance to vulnerable communities. It also suggests providing allocation to groups that 
most merit compensation and assistance. More research on the distribution of mitigation 
potential is needed before these should be translated into policy implications. Our 
inability to confidently assess the potential effects of higher prices might, however, 
suggest more weight on protecting against the full impact of prices on output, as least 
during an adjustment period.     
4.1  Suggestions for further empirical research 
1.  Model the implications of farmers’ abilities to gain credit from post-1990 native 
sequestration or plantation forestry for the burden of the ETS on extensive (low 
productivity) sheep/beef farms. 
2.  Model the implications of land use and management changes for the level and 
distribution of costs. 
o  Simulate mitigation options on a wider range of farms. 
o  Use different methodologies to explore potential movements in 
land use and management. 
3.  Model the implications of different allocation methods for the total net impact and 
distribution of net impact under different dynamic scenarios. This would build on 
recent MAF work.    
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4.  Empirically explore the likely effect of contractions in New Zealand production for 
the price we receive for dairy and meat products using export data on volume and 
value of exports by destination across years.   46 
Appendix A: Calculating profits and emissions 
Dairy 
We collected dairy data from the dairy section from the MAF  Farm 
Monitoring Report (MAF, 2008a). It divides New Zealand into six regions: Northland, 
Waikato and Bay of Plenty, Taranaki, Lower North Island, Canterbury, Southland; and 
also the nation as a whole. However, it was not until the 2007/08 report that the 
Taranaki region first entered the report. It was previously part of lower North Island. 
For each region, MAF collects data on ‘effective area’, ‘number of milking 
cows’, ‘profit before tax’, and ‘interest payments’. At the national level, the value of 
‘effective area’  and ‘number of milking cows’ are calculated by value weighting each 
region’s data, where the weights are provided in each report. 
The economic profit per hectare (EBIT) data are calculated by 
𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄 𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐩 𝐡𝐡𝐡𝐡  =
 (𝐏𝐏𝐩𝐩𝐏𝐏𝐏𝐏𝐏𝐏𝐏𝐏 𝐛𝐛𝐩𝐩𝐏𝐏𝐏𝐏𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐩 𝐏𝐏𝐡𝐡𝐭𝐭  +  𝐄𝐄𝐈𝐈𝐏𝐏𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐈𝐈𝐏𝐏  +  𝐑𝐑𝐩𝐩𝐈𝐈𝐏𝐏)/𝐏𝐏𝐏𝐏𝐏𝐏𝐡𝐡𝐭𝐭 𝐩𝐩𝐏𝐏𝐏𝐏𝐩𝐩𝐞𝐞𝐏𝐏𝐏𝐏𝐞𝐞𝐩𝐩 𝐡𝐡𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐡𝐡    (1) 
The emissions  per hectare data are calculated mostly using data and 
methodology from the LURNZ model. There are three sources of emissions from dairy 
cattle: methane emissions from enteric activity, nitrous oxide emissions from manure, 
and nitrous oxide emissions from fertiliser use. LURNZ has estimated Implied Emission 
Factors (IEF) measured in tonnes of CO2-e for each source of emission per milking 
cow.
21
For methane emissions from enteric activity and nitrous oxide emissions from 
manure, we multiply the sum of the average IEFs from 1999 to 2007 by ‘number of 
milking cows’ to get total emissions for each region. We then divide total emissions by 
‘effective area’ to obtain emissions per effective hectare. 
 
The  nitrous oxide  emissions  from fertiliser usage is trickier to calculate. 
LURNZv1  predicts  fertiliser usage per hectare  for each sector from 2001-07.  We 
combine the IEF for fertiliser with usage per hectare estimates to obtain the fertiliser 
emissions per hectare estimates.
22
   
  
                                                            
21 For more information see Hendy and Kerr (2005) 
22 We ignore 1999 and 2000 for estimating average emissions from fertiliser. This will create a small 
upward bias but these are a small share of total emissions.    
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The total emissions per hectare data from 1999-2007 are the sum of CH4 
emissions from enteric activity; NO2 emissions from manure; and NO2 emissions from 
fertiliser use. 
Finally, the profit after accounting for the emission cost can be expressed as 
𝐍𝐍𝐩𝐩𝐏𝐏 𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐏𝐏𝐏𝐏𝐏𝐏𝐏𝐏  =  𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄 𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐩 𝐡𝐡𝐡𝐡 – 𝐄𝐄𝐏𝐏𝐏𝐏𝐡𝐡𝐭𝐭 𝐩𝐩𝐞𝐞𝐏𝐏𝐈𝐈𝐈𝐈𝐏𝐏𝐏𝐏𝐈𝐈 𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐩 𝐡𝐡𝐡𝐡  × 𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝛐𝛐 𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐏𝐏𝐞𝐞𝐩𝐩  (2) 
Sheep-beef  
Sheep-beef data were purchased from Meat and Wool Ltd
23 (Meat and Wool 
Economic  Service, 2008). The methodology used to generate the regional emissions 
costs is based on the Meat and Wool Economic Service model with small changes.
24
There are four difference sources of CO2-e emissions: fuel usage, electricity 
usage, N fertiliser, and livestock. Livestock includes sheep, beef cattle, deer, and dairy 
cattle. 
 The 
model assigns a hypothetical price for a tonne of CO2-e. By identifying the sources of 
CO2-e emissions for a sheep/beef farm, the model calculates the emission costs from 
each source. 
Fuel emissions 
For fuel emissions, the raw data only provides fuel expenses data. The model 
assumes that 36% of fuel is petrol consumption while 64% is diesel consumption. For 
2006 data, the petrol price is assumed to be $1.48 per litre and the diesel price is assumed 
to be $1 per litre. The number of litres of petrol and diesel usage is calculated by dividing 
expenses on both kinds of fuel by their prices.  
The Emissions Factors (EF) for petrol and diesel are 0.0024 and 0.0027 per 
litre. The emissions from fuel consumption is therefore calculated by  
𝐅𝐅𝐅𝐅𝐩𝐩𝐭𝐭 𝐩𝐩𝐞𝐞𝐏𝐏𝐈𝐈𝐈𝐈𝐏𝐏𝐏𝐏𝐈𝐈  =  𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐏𝐏𝐩𝐩𝐏𝐏𝐭𝐭 𝐅𝐅𝐈𝐈𝐡𝐡𝐮𝐮𝐩𝐩  ×  𝛎𝛎.𝛎𝛎𝛎𝛎𝛐𝛐𝛎𝛎  +  𝐃𝐃𝐏𝐏𝐩𝐩𝐈𝐈𝐩𝐩𝐭𝐭 𝐅𝐅𝐈𝐈𝐡𝐡𝐮𝐮𝐩𝐩  ×  𝛎𝛎.𝛎𝛎𝛎𝛎𝛐𝛐𝛎𝛎  (2) 
Table 16 shows the emissions  costs from fuel given the 2006 data and 
assuming $25 cost per tonne of CO2-e. 
   
                                                            
23 The contact person for the dataset is Rob Davison (Rob.Davison@meatandwoolnz.com) from Meat and 
Wool Ltd. 
24 The model is an MS Excel based computer model from Meat and Wool Ltd. The contact person for the 
model is Con Williams (con.williams@meatandwoolnz.com)   48 
Table 15: Class definition for sheep-beef farms in New Zealand 
Class  ES Farm Class 
Characteristics 
1  South Island High Country 
Extensive run country located at high altitude 
carrying fine wool sheep, with wool as the main 
source of revenue.  Located mainly in Marlborough, 
Canterbury and Otago. 
2  South Island Hill Country 
Mainly mid micron wool sheep mostly carrying 
between two and seven stock units per  hectare.  
Three quarters of the stock units wintered are sheep 
and one quarter beef cattle. 
3  North Island Hard Hill Country 
Steep hill country or low fertility soils with most 
farms carrying six to ten stock units per hectare.   
While some stock are finished a significant 
proportion are sold in store condition. 
4  North Island Hill Country 
Easier hill country or higher fertility soils than Class 
3.  Mostly carrying between eight and thirteen stock 
units per hectare.  A high proportion of sale stock 
sold is in forward store or prime condition. 
5 
North Island Intensive 
Finishing Farms 
Easy contour farmland with the potential for high 
production.  Mostly carrying between eight and 
fourteen stock units per hectare.  A high proportion 
of stock is sent to slaughter and replacements are 




A more extensive type of finishing farm, also 
encompassing some irrigation units and frequently 
with some cash cropping.  Carrying capacity ranges 
from six to eleven stock units per hectare on dryland 
farms and over twelve stock units per hectare on 
irrigated units.  Mainly in Canterbury and Otago.   
This is the dominant farm class in the South Island. 
7 
South Island Intensive 
Finishing Farms 
High producing grassland farms carrying about ten 
to fourteen stock units per hectare with some cash 
crop.  Located mainly in Southland, South and West 
Otago. 
8 
South Island Mixed Finishing 
Farms 
Mainly on the Canterbury plains with a high 
proportion of the revenue are derived from grain 
and small seed production as well as stock finishing. 
9  Average  Average 
Source: Meat and Wool  Economic Service Ltd New Zealand 
      
  49 
Table 16: Regional emissions costs for petrol and diesel for  2006 (per ha) 
   Class/Petrol emission costs per ha 
Production Region  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
East Coast      $0.07  $0.16  $0.26        $0.14 
Marlborough-Canterbury  $0.02  $0.07        $0.33    $1.06  $0.19 
New Zealand  $0.02  $0.08  $0.10  $0.19  $0.28  $0.30  $0.46  $1.06  $0.18 
Northland-Waikato-BoP      $0.11  $0.22  $0.33        $0.21 
Otago/Southland  $0.03  $0.12        $0.25  $0.46    $0.17 
Taranaki-Manawatu      $0.14  $0.19  $0.28        $0.18 
  Class/Diesel emission costs per ha 
Production Region  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
East Coast      $0.22  $0.47  $0.76        $0.42 
Marlborough-Canterbury  $0.06  $0.21        $0.98    $3.13  $0.55 
New Zealand  $0.07  $0.24  $0.30  $0.57  $0.84  $0.88  $1.37  $3.13  $0.52 
Northland-Waikato-BoP      $0.33  $0.65  $0.97        $0.63 
Otago/Southland  $0.09  $0.36        $0.74  $1.37    $0.50 
Taranaki-Manawatu      $0.41  $0.57  $0.84        $0.54 
  Class/Total fuel emission costs per ha 
Production Region  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
East Coast      $0.30  $0.63  $1.02        $0.56 
Marlborough-Canterbury  $0.07  $0.28        $1.31    $4.18  $0.74 
New Zealand  $0.09  $0.32  $0.40  $0.76  $1.12  $1.17  $1.83  $4.18  $0.69 
Northland-Waikato-BoP      $0.44  $0.88  $1.29        $0.84 
Otago/Southland  $0.11  $0.48        $0.98  $1.83    $0.67 
Taranaki-Manawatu      $0.55  $0.76  $1.13        $0.72 
 
Electricity emissions 
The raw data provides information on electricity expenses. The model breaks 
the expenses into two categories: fixed charges and electricity charges. The fixed charge 
is calculated by 
𝐅𝐅𝐏𝐏𝐭𝐭𝐩𝐩𝐅𝐅 𝐞𝐞𝐡𝐡𝐡𝐡𝐩𝐩𝐮𝐮𝐩𝐩  =  $𝛏𝛏.𝛓𝛓  ×  𝛑𝛑𝛑𝛑𝛓𝛓 (𝐅𝐅𝐡𝐡𝐝𝐝𝐈𝐈) (3) 
The electricity charge is calculated by  
𝐄𝐄𝐭𝐭𝐩𝐩𝐞𝐞𝐏𝐏𝐩𝐩𝐏𝐏𝐞𝐞𝐏𝐏𝐏𝐏𝐝𝐝 𝐞𝐞𝐡𝐡𝐡𝐡𝐩𝐩𝐮𝐮𝐩𝐩  =   𝐄𝐄𝐏𝐏𝐏𝐏𝐡𝐡𝐭𝐭 𝐩𝐩𝐭𝐭𝐩𝐩𝐞𝐞𝐏𝐏𝐩𝐩𝐏𝐏𝐞𝐞𝐏𝐏𝐏𝐏𝐝𝐝 𝐩𝐩𝐭𝐭𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐈𝐈𝐈𝐈𝐩𝐩 – 𝐅𝐅𝐏𝐏𝐭𝐭𝐩𝐩𝐅𝐅 𝐞𝐞𝐡𝐡𝐡𝐡𝐩𝐩𝐮𝐮𝐩𝐩  (4) 
By assuming the price of electricity is $0.2 per Kwh, the electricity usage is 
then calculated by dividing electricity charges by the assumed price. Using this method, 
we calculate the EF for electricity to be 0.00023325
   
 tonne of CO2-e per Kwh. 
                                                            
25 The emission factor for electricity is from Table 1 of Page 9 in a CRA report  -- Impact of the NZ ETS 
on Cement Manufacturing.   50 
Table 17: Regional emissions costs for electricity for 2006 (per ha) 
   Class/Electricity emission costs 
Production Region  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
East Coast      $0.05  $0.09  $0.18        $0.09 
Marlborough-Canterbury  $0.01  $0.06        $0.33    $1.41  $0.20 
New Zealand  $0.02  $0.07  $0.06  $0.10  $0.15  $0.22  $0.16  $1.41  $0.12 
Northland-Waikato-BoP      $0.04  $0.10  $0.09        $0.09 
Otago/Southland  $0.02  $0.08        $0.07  $0.16    $0.07 
Taranaki-Manawatu      $0.07  $0.11  $0.11        $0.09 
 
N fertiliser emissions 
The data on tonnes of N fertiliser used is directly extracted from the model, 
where the usage measure by tonne is given for each class from Class 1 to Class 9 at year 
2006. The EF for N fertiliser emissions is assumed to be 5.27 tonne of CO2-e per one 
tonne usage of fertiliser.  
Table 18: Regional emissions costs for N fertiliser for 2006 (per ha) 
   Class 
Production Region  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
East Coast      $0.76  $1.27  $1.93        $1.25 
Marlborough-Canterbury  $0.04  $0.34        $1.86    $11.69  $0.88 
New Zealand  $0.05  $0.37  $0.94  $1.60  $2.46  $1.50  $0.91  $11.69  $1.17 
Northland-Waikato-BoP      $1.21  $1.95  $2.79        $2.06 
Otago/Southland  $0.05  $0.48        $0.99  $0.91    $0.92 
Taranaki-Manawatu      $1.04  $1.46  $3.42        $1.58 
Note: As the model only gives the usage of N fertiliser for difference classes, there is no regional effect 




The raw data provides the number of animals at open date (July 1) each year. 
Four types of animal are accounted for: sheep, beef cattle, deer, and dairy cattle. By using 
the animal number to stock unit factor from the LURNZ model, the number of animals 
is transferred to stock units. The conversion factors are  
Dairy cattle = 6.15 Stock Unit (su, hereafter) 
Beef cattle = 4.874 su 
Sheep = 0.923 su 
Assume: deer = 0.923 su as well     
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(Note: The Meat and Wool Economic Service model includes stock unit data, 
which are not included in the raw data. Moreover, the model does not factor deer into 
the calculation. However, what we have produced using the method described above is 
not significantly different from the results produced by Meat and Wool Economic 
Service’s  model). 
The EFs for each type of animal are given as 
EF_sheep =  0.359 tonnes of CO2-e per SU of sheep 
EF_beefcattle = 0.35 tonnes of CO2-e per SU of beef cattle 
EF_dairycattle = 0.381 tonnes of CO2-e per SU of dairy cattle 
 EF_deer = 0.362 tonnes of CO2-e per SU of deer. 52 
Appendix B: Additional tables and maps 
Table 19: Description of simulated dairy models used in Smeaton and deKlein (2008) 
Note 1:  ‘Profit ranking’ is measured so that 1 is most profitable and 8 is least profitable. 























Base farm: avg N, imported feed   2.97  119  1.3  480  100  974  328  2047  3.92  8 
Avg N, imp feed, big cows, high BW -System f  2.45  119  1.0  550  110  1008  411  2639  3.40  1 
Even more N, no imp feed -System d  2.69  188  0.0  480  100  985  366  2534  3.47  2 
Even more N, more imp feed -System c  2.95  188  1.4  480  100  1086  368  2469  3.77  3 
Avg N, no imported feed –System a  2.69  119  0.0  480  100  909  338  2313  3.49  4 
More N, more imp feed –System b  3.02  158  1.3  480  100  1044  346  2243  3.88  5 
Average N, imp feed, big cows -System e  2.69  119  1.2  550  100  952  354  2128  3.79  6 
No N, no imp feed –System g  2.41  0  0.0  480  100  797  331  2125  3.36  7 
 
Keys to abbreviations: 
•  SR = stocking rate 
•  N used = Nitrogen fertiliser applied per year 
•  Imp feed = amount of feed imported onto the farm per year 
•  Cow BW = cow breeding worth or genetic merit 
•  Prod = production, ms = milk solids per year 
•  GM = gross margin profit per year 
•  FWEs = cash farm working expenses per year 
•  GHG = green house gas    
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Table 20: Descriptive data for the model of the all-classes Central North Island King Country sheep & beef farm.  The rows in the table show the base model and the 
intensification options ‘a to e’ 
 
 Keys to abbreviations: 
•  GM profit = gross margin profit per ha per year 
•  Production net = all beef, sheep liveweight and wool production inclusive of sales and purchases and includes dairy heifer liveweight gain 
•  Cows = breeding cows 
•  Heifers = dairy heifer grazers 
•  N used = Nitrogen fertiliser applied per year 
•  SU = stock units 
•  Bulls, F bulls = Friesian bulls 
•  Beef = all beef animals excluding F bulls and dairy heifer grazers 
GM profit Production No of  No of  No of  No of  N used Total Sheep Beef F bulls Heifers Wool
System description $/ha net, kg/ha cows ewes bulls heifers kg N/ha SU/ha SU/ha SU/ha SU/ha SU/ha kg/ha
Base = Monitor farm Scen 0 415 190 145 2700 30 0 7 10.0 6.3 3.8 0.2 0 28
Increase prod with more N -System a 450 237 182 3398 38 0 40 12.5 7.8 4.7 0.3 0 35
Increase N, incr bull nos only -System b 504 317 145 2700 455 0 40 13.4 6.3 7.1 3.6 0 28
Incr N, use crop, incr bulls only -System c 539 318 145 2700 458 0 37 13.4 6.3 7.1 3.6 0 28
Increase N, incr hfrs only -System d 444 242 145 2700 0 300 40 12.0 6.3 3.5 0 2.2 28
Incr N, use crop, incr hfrs only -System e 541 279 145 2700 0 470 37 13.4 6.3 3.5 0 3.6 2854 
 
Table  21: Dairy farms across regions and years: economic profit (EBIT) per hectare and 
EBIT per hectare net of emissions costs, at $25 per tonne CO2-e, in 2007 dollars 





Canterbury Southland National 
2001  $2,267  $2,505    $2,765  $3,126  $3,616  $2,687 
  ($2,058)  ($2,221)    ($2,486)  ($2,813)  ($3,325)  ($2,411) 
               
2002  $1,933  $2,858    $2,724  $2,978  $3,119  $2,683 
  ($1,701)  ($2,549)    ($2,429)  ($2,643)  ($2,810)  ($2,385) 
               
2003  $1,089  $1,337    $993  $1,397  $1,016  $956 
  ($848)  ($1,029)    ($700)  ($1,046)  ($710)  ($649) 
               
2004  $948  $1,539    $1,464  $1,807  $1,548  $1,516 
  ($708)  ($1,249)    ($1,172)  ($1,471)  ($1,246)  ($1,220) 
               
2005  $1,277  $1,519    $1,423  $2,391  $1,555  $1,637 
  ($1,038)  ($1,234)    ($1,131)  ($2,037)  ($1,260)  ($1,341) 
               
2006  $1,114  $1,290    $1,534  $2,182  $1,820  $1,578 
  ($877)  ($1,000)    ($1,256)  ($1,831)  ($1,536)  ($1,283) 
               
2007  $1,048  $1,095    $1,387  $1,796  $1,749  $1,405 
  ($818)  ($813)    ($1,110)  ($1,445)  ($1,473)  ($1,113) 
               
2008  $2,821  $3,089  $3,360  $3,413  $5,347  $4,660  $3,882 
  ($2,600)  ($2,814)  ($3,091) ($3,143)  ($5,009)  ($4,376)  ($3,597) 
               
Average  $1,502  $1,836  $3,360  $1,940  $2,553  $2,315  $1,991 
  ($1,272)  ($1,546)  ($3,091) ($1,656)  ($2,217)  ($2,021)  ($1,700) 
 
Derived from MAF Farm Monitoring Reports   
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Table 22: Dairy farms across regions and years: cash profit per hectare and cash profit per 
hectare net of emissions costs, at $25 per tonne CO2-e, in 2007 dollars 
Year 





Canterbury Southland National 
2001  $2,039  $2,073    $2,440  $2,695  $3,104  $2,302 
  ($1,830)  ($1,788)    ($2,161)  ($2,381)  ($2,813)  ($2,026) 
               
2002  $1,721  $2,452    $2,304  $2,505  $2,408  $2,264 
  ($1,489)  ($2,143)    ($2,009)  ($2,170)  ($2,099)  ($1,967) 
               
2003  $887  $976    $571  $628  $300  $496 
  ($645)  ($667)    ($279)  ($277)  (-$6)  ($189) 
               
2004  $740  $999    $1,053  $1,023  $973  $932 
  ($500)  ($710)    ($761)  ($687)  ($671)  ($636) 
               
2005  $1,037  $950    $977  $1,557  $663  $1,018 
  ($798)  ($666)    ($685)  ($1,203)  ($368)  ($722) 
               
2006  $871  $712    $959  $1,305  $897  $919 
  ($634)  ($422)    ($681)  ($954)  ($614)  ($624) 
               
2007  $788  $483    $746  $488  $559  $571 
  ($558)  ($201)    ($469)  ($137)  ($283)  ($279) 
               
2008  $2,334  $2,099  $2,714  $2,299  $3,997  $3,272  $2,808 
  ($2,113)  ($1,824)  ($2,445)  ($2,029)  ($3,658)  ($2,988)  ($2,522) 
               
Average  $1,247  $1,290  $2,714  $1,421  $1,746  $1,540  $1,378 
  ($1,017)  ($999)  ($2,445)  ($1,137)  ($1,410)  ($1,246)  ($1,086) 
 
Derived from MAF Farm Monitoring Reports 56 




costs   EBIT  Farm profit 
before tax 
2001  $25,387  $246,952  $211,581 
2002  $28,419  $256,533  $216,495 
2003  $33,733  $105,072  $54,451 
2004  $34,268  $175,516  $107,955 
2005  $34,479  $190,719  $118,658 
2006  $36,115  $193,394  $112,565 
2007  $36,627  $176,503  $71,689 
2008  $39,423  $556,862  $407,875 
Note: the numbers are calculated by taking weighted average by regions 
 
 
Table 24: Dairy by region and year: Percentage impacts on economic profit, $25 per tonne 
CO2-e 





Island  Canterbury  Southland  National 
2001  -9.2%  -11%    -10%  -10%  -8.0%  -10% 
2002  -12%  -11%    -11%  -11%  -10%  -11% 
2003  -22%  -23%    -29%  -25%  -30%  -32% 
2004  -25%  -19%    -20%  -19%  -19%  -20% 
2005  -19%  -19%    -21%  -15%  -19%  -18% 
2006  -21%  -22%    -18%  -16%  -16%  -19% 
2007  -22%  -26%    -20%  -20%  -16%  -21% 
2008  -7.8%  -8.9%  -8.0%  -7.9%  -6.3%  -6.1%  -7.4% 
Average  -15%  -16%  -8.0%  -15%  -13%  -13%  -15% 
 
 
Table 25: Dairy by region and year: Percentage impacts on cash profit at $25 per tonne CO2-e 





Island  Canterbury Southland  National 
2001  -10%  -14%    -11%  -12%  -9%  -12% 
2002  -14%  -13%    -13%  -13%  -13%  -13% 
2003  -27%  -32%    -51%  -56%  -102%  -62% 
2004  -32%  -29%    -28%  -33%  -31%  -32% 
2005  -23%  -30%    -30%  -23%  -45%  -29% 
2006  -27%  -41%    -29%  -27%  -32%  -32% 
2007  -29%  -58%    -37%  -72%  -49%  -51% 
2008  -9.5%  -13%  -10%  -12%  -8.5%  -8.7%  -10% 
Average %change  -18%  -23%  -10%  -20%  -19%  -19%  -21% 
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Table 26: Sheep/Beef: Average farm emission liability, economic and cash profits, in 2007 
dollars 
Year  Total emission 
costs 
 Economic 
Profit  Cash Profit 
2001  $41,336  $143,879  $112,292 
2002  $40,953  $167,214  $134,626 
2003  $42,526  $138,942  $100,254 
2004  $40,480  $110,302  $72,873 
2005  $40,453  $121,253  $77,682 
2006  $40,000  $90,528  $42,532 
2007  $40,398  $92,798  $45,400 
2008  $44,966  $80,505  $27,799 
Note: the numbers are calculated by taking area-weighted average by regions and class 
 
Table 27: Sheep/beef by region and class: Average (2001-2008) economic profit per hectare 
and (economic profit per hectare net of emission costs), at $25 per tonne CO2-e, in 2007 
dollars 
 
  Class 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
East Coast 
    $147  $276  $351       
    ($81) ($199) ($272)       
                 
Marlborough-
Canterbury 
$16  $69        $223    $511 
($7) ($40)        ($148)    ($470) 
                 
Northland-Waikato-BoP 
    $187  $264  $453       
    ($111) ($178) ($371)       
                 
Otago/Southland 
$16 $123        $259  $455   
($4) ($73)        ($191) ($369)   
                 
Taranaki-Manawatu 
    $181  $276  $346       
    ($109) ($195) ($256)       
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Table 28: Sheep/beef by region and class: Average (2001-2008) sheep-beef farm cash profit per 
hectare and (cash profit per hectare net of emission costs), at $25 per tonne CO2-e, in 2007 
dollars 
 
  Class 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
East Coast 
    $87  $185  $240       
    ($17) ($102) ($155)       
                 
Marlborough-
Canterbury 
$11  $44        $132    $223 
($1) ($13)        ($51)    ($164) 
                 
Northland-Waikato-BoP 
    $121  $175  $339       
    ($40) ($85) ($249)       
                 
Otago/Southland 
$7  $90        $196  $329   
(-$6) ($39)        ($124) ($235)   
                 
Taranaki-Manawatu 
    $89  $181  $271       
    ($11) ($94) ($175)       
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Figure  11: Dairy and sheep/beef combined liability map: Average (2001-2008) emission 
liability per ha, in 2007 dollars  
 
 60    
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Table 29: Dairy and sheep/beef combined liability (2000-07 average in thousands in 2007 
dollars) and population (16 to 65 in thousands) by labour market area 
Labour 
Market Area 
Liability from dairy 
Liability from 
sheep-beef 
Liability from both 
sectors 
Population 
Kaitaia  2856.0  2789.8  5645.8  10.6 
Kerikeri  2494.7  2322.4  4817.1  13.0 
Kaikohe  3160.0  3242.8  6402.8  8.3 
Whangarei  15398.4  4983.5  20381.9  43.6 
Dargaville  8505.0  3873.0  12378.0  6.0 
Warkworth  12668.5  5703.9  18372.5  15.9 
Auckland  2328.2  2604.7  4933.0  465.6 
SthAuckland  13564.0  6342.8  19906.8  310.2 
Thames  12466.4  1936.6  14403.0  18.4 
Waihi  3586.7  512.5  4099.2  8.5 
Ngaruawahia  17919.1  469.4  18388.5  6.6 
Morrinsville  6570.8  289.6  6860.4  5.3 
Matamata  7710.7  302.6  8013.3  6.1 
Hamilton  29782.8  7032.4  36815.2  117.1 
Te Awamutu  10310.0  831.6  11141.6  10.8 
Otorohanga  15406.9  4881.8  20288.7  6.0 
Tokoroa  13649.8  677.5  14327.4  15.2 
TeKuiti  5278.4  12526.9  17805.3  5.9 
Taupo  8104.6  6539.6  14644.2  19.2 
Te Puke  6236.8  863.5  7100.3  9.2 
Tauranga  2831.6  1317.0  4148.6  68.2 
Rotorua  15102.0  2246.5  17348.5  43.1 
Whakatane  9823.5  1329.1  11152.7  27.6 
Gisborne  735.8  22583.9  23319.7  26.7 
Hastings  334.1  5528.2  5862.3  38.4 
Napier  1961.6  22256.1  24217.7  42.9 
Waipukurau  2089.6  19139.5  21229.1  8.2 
New Plymouth  28067.9  3228.5  31296.4  44.4 
Stratford  9033.5  3786.4  12819.9  6.8 
Hawera  19371.1  2457.4  21828.5  11.7 
Taumaranui  1176.2  11321.8  12498.0  5.6 
Taihape  1179.0  19804.2  20983.2  6.8 
Wanganui  3467.7  8685.7  12153.4  27.7 
Bulls  2629.7  2539.3  5169.0  5.8 
Palmerston 
Nth 
14157.9  11183.2  25341.1  69.7 
Dannevirke  6744.9  12970.9  19715.8  6.3 
Eketahuna  6354.0  7079.8  13433.8  4.6 
Levin  4221.8  1260.3  5482.1  18.2 
Hutt Valley  248.8  310.0  558.7  83.1 
Wellington  71.1  1134.4  1205.4  174.3 
Masterton  8727.9  18623.0  27350.9  22.2 
Motueka  262.3  446.5  708.8  7.9 62 
Nelson  11314.1  3407.7  14721.8  50.3 
Picton  2141.9  975.7  3117.6  5.0 
Blenheim  998.1  8517.5  9515.6  20.1 
Kaikoura  1400.7  1848.4  3249.1  2.3 
Greymouth  14293.8  2113.8  16407.6  14.3 
Christchurch  21882.8  37581.3  59464.1  265.6 
Ashburton  12623.1  11305.8  23928.9  16.0 
Waimate  9644.5  14946.7  24591.1  30.1 
MacKenzie  360.7  11847.1  12207.7  2.7 
Oamaru  7137.7  11874.7  19012.4  11.1 
Alexandra  947.1  24118.8  25065.9  12.4 
Queenstown  51.0  3854.3  3905.3  9.1 
Dunedin  3395.3  12603.4  15998.7  79.0 
Balclutha  8564.3  16857.5  25421.8  9.1 
Gore  12134.0  41498.6  53632.5  16.2 
Invercargill  21807.3  20230.9  42038.2  44.2 
Population data – 2001 Census 
 
Figure 12: Combined total emissions liability by labour market area: average over 2001-07, in 
2007 dollars 
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Table 30: Revenue in different account from 1980/81 to 1989/90, real dollar per hectare, at 
2008 dollars 


















1980-81  226.9  200.6  98.3  0.4  .  .  53.0  10.5  589.7 
1981-82  241.2  198.2  90.5  -0.2  .  .  50.8  10.0  590.4 
1982-83  226.3  198.1  102.2  0.2  .  .  66.9  11.0  604.7 
1983-84  214.1  201.4  78.1  -2.5  0.1  0.1  79.1  12.9  583.6 
1984-85  224.3  212.1  103.9  0.4  1.3  0.1  78.5  12.6  633.4 
1985-86  183.4  108.0  81.4  3.6  0.6  0.2  67.4  15.0  459.9 
1986-87  171.5  110.8  75.6  4.1  0.8  0.1  47.8  10.6  421.6 
1987-88  189.5  102.4  69.3  5.1  0.7  0.6  38.9  11.4  418.6 
1988-89  197.2  87.7  80.2  4.0  -0.1  1.0  38.6  13.0  422.6 
1989-90  156.0  121.4  90.0  4.7  -0.1  0.7  49.2  12.6  436.1 
 
 




1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
East Coast        168.6  344.8  502.7           304.2 
Marlborough-Canterbury  16.7  70.3           280.6     622.8  170.1 
Northland-Waikato-BoP        233.1  317.4  593.4           361.5 
Otago/Southland  22.8              355.1  636.8     206.5 
Taranaki-Manwatu        188.7  384.8  557.9           389.4 
New Zealand  18.6  68.1  182.5  346.0  541.4  292.6  636.8  622.8  237.7 
 
 




1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
East Coast        131.7  238.6  371.4           227.1 
Marlborough-Canterbury  23.8  67.4           205.5     417.0  134.7 
Northland-Waikato-BoP        209.3  273.7  397.3           290.4 
Otago/Southland  35.0              288.5  514.0     180.4 
Taranaki-Manwatu        176.9  278.9  375.1           281.0 
New Zealand  27.5  69.1  151.4  260.5  378.9  224.1  514.0  417.0  189.4 64 
Table 33: Revenue in different account from 1980/81 to 1984/85 and simulated revenue from 
1985/86 to 1989/90, real dollar per hectare, in 2008 dollars 


















1980-81  226.9  200.6  98.3  0.4      53.0  10.5  589.7 
1981-82  241.2  198.2  90.5  -0.2      50.8  10.0  590.4 
1982-83  226.3  198.1  102.2  0.2      66.9  11.0  604.7 
1983-84  214.1  201.4  78.1  -2.5  0.1  0.1  79.1  12.9  583.3 
1984-85  224.3  212.1  103.9  0.4  1.3  0.1  78.5  12.6  633.2 
1985-86  213.2  216.3  91.4  0.4  1.3  0.1  78.5  12.6  614.0 
1986-87  214.2  190.4  93.0  0.4  1.3  0.1  78.5  12.6  590.7 
1987-88  211.3  165.4  91.4  0.4  1.3  0.1  78.5  12.6  561.1 
1988-89  205.6  159.6  88.2  0.4  1.3  0.1  78.5  12.6  546.4 
1989-90  198.0  153.2  84.5  0.4  1.3  0.1  78.5  12.6  528.7 
Note:  For example, the simulated revenue for Wool Account in 1985/86 will equal Average revenue (1980/81 to 84/85) from 
Wool Account * (1+decrease in PSE in Wool from 84 to 85), where decrease in PSE in Wool from 84 to 85 = (PSE85,wool – 
PSE84,wool)/PSE84,wool. 
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Appendix C: Data Set References 
 
Meat and Wool Economic Service, “Sheep and Beef Farm Survey: Sheep/Beef Data 
1980 – 2009,” obtained by Motu Economic and Public Policy Research in 
2009, Restricted Raw Data Set 9954, information available online at
                   http://www.motu.org.nz/building-capacity/datasets.   66 
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